This article was downloaded by: *[Daxecker, Ursula E.]*
On: *28 September 2009*
Access details: *Access Details: [subscription number 915372833]*
Publisher *Routledge*
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Civil Wars
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634578

Opposition Movements, Liberalization, and Civil War: Evidence from Algeria and Chile

Ursula E. Daxecker [a]
[a] Colorado State University, USA

Online Publication Date: 01 September 2009

To cite this Article Daxecker, Ursula E.(2009)'Opposition Movements, Liberalization, and Civil War: Evidence from Algeria and Chile',Civil Wars,11:3,234 — 254

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13698240903157503

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240903157503

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Opposition Movements, Liberalization, and Civil War: Evidence from Algeria and Chile

URSULA E. DAXECKER

When does bargaining between government and opposition groups turn violent? In this article, I argue that groups with cohesive, developed organizational structures are less likely to engage in conflictual behavior. Opposition movements are often divided into moderate and radical challengers, and groups without developed organizational structures cannot limit radicals' demands. The argument is supported in a comparative analysis of bargaining processes in Algeria and Chile in the late 1980s. In Algeria, the primary opposition group was marred by internal divisions and tensions between radical and moderate elements. When the party emerged victorious in democratic elections, the government feared that radical elements would soon take over, canceled election results and attempted to reestablish control by using force. Opposition parties in Chile, however, presented a cohesive and unified alternative to the Pinochet regime, which contributed to a peaceful transfer of power.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

INTRODUCTION

What explains whether bargaining between government and opposition groups will result in the use of force? Why do some opposition groups succeed in peacefully negotiating agreements with authoritarian leaders, whereas negotiations with others are followed by violence? For example, bargaining over power in the Ukraine's Orange Revolution ended with an electoral victory of the opposition party led by Victor Yushchenko and the peaceful establishment of a democratic government. By contrast, following the electoral victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, violent conflict between the two major parties, Hamas and Fatah, resulted in the division of the Palestinian territories and recurring violent clashes. How can we explain this variation?

Research on civil war has only recently started to pay attention to the role of opposition groups. While civil wars are fought between a state and one or more non-state actors, the vast majority of research has focused on features of the nation-state. For example, many arguments on civil war emphasize national attributes such as economic development, ethnicity, regime type, or income inequality. However, to understand why civil wars occur it is important to know not only the role of state actors but also the motivations driving non-state actors. Put differently, why do

Civil Wars, Vol.11, No.3 (September 2009), pp.234–254
ISSN 1369-8249 print/ISSN 1743-968X online
DOI: 10.1080/13698240903157503 © 2009 Taylor & Francis

challenges by some non-state actors turn violent, and what types of actors are particularly likely to experience the use of force?

In this article, I investigate the role of opposition groups in civil war onset. Specifically, I argue that bargaining between government and opposition results in commitment problems, and that only certain types of opposition groups are able to make credible commitments. To develop this argument, I focus on cases in which liberalization was initiated by authoritarian leaders, subsequently triggering intense bargaining between actors. It is argued here that the organizational structure of opposition groups has important consequences for the outcome of this process. Opposition movements with cohesive organizational structures and links to existing social organizations are more likely to make credible commitments to sharing power. Cohesive, hierarchical organizations are better at in-group policing and can therefore coerce more radical opposition members and enforce compromises.[1]

The article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the treatment of opposition groups in the existing literature on civil war. A subsequent section develops the theoretical argument, which expects that the organizational structure of opposition groups influences their ability to negotiate peaceful outcomes during bargaining processes. In the empirical section, the argument is tested by analyzing the behavior of opposition groups in two individual cases.[2] Liberalization initiated by the authoritarian leadership triggered bargaining over power in Algeria and Chile in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but resulted in a violent outcome in only the Algerian case. The analysis shows that the cohesiveness of opposition groups and links with existing institutions help explain this variation, thus supporting the theoretical argument. A conclusion summarizes the findings.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE STUDY OF CIVIL WAR

Theoretical explanations of civil war have become highly sophisticated and increasingly take into account actors' individual motivations and the strategic nature of civil war.[3] However, much of the empirical testing continues to focus on attributes of the state actors involved while neglecting the role of opposition groups.[4]

Bargaining theories of war, for example, provide theoretical accounts that help understand individuals' actions. By emphasizing the strategic nature of civil war, they explicitly focus on the motivations of actors and the interactions between state actors and rebel groups. Informational approaches, for example, outline how actors in civil war have incentives to misrepresent their own capabilities and resolve to gain a military advantage.[5] Analyzing civil war as a bargaining process, Gates examines (1) why individuals make the costly decision of joining a rebel group and (2) why they remain members of the group despite having to engage in violence and endure personal hardship.[6] Gates concludes that geographical proximity, shared ethnicity, and a common ideology are mechanisms facilitating compliance and enforcement in rebel organizations. Finally, economic models of civil war have stressed the opportunity costs of rebellion, where the availability of rents (such as

natural resources, foreign aid, or donations from diasporas) and the capacity of the state influence individuals' decisions to rebel.[7]

Yet while bargaining and economic models of civil war provide increasingly detailed accounts for individual and group behavior, a gap persists between theoretical explanations and the empirical tests. The vast majority of empirical evidence is based on the state, or macro-level of analysis. Both Fearon and Laitin, and Collier and Hoeffler propose micro-level theories, but use macro-level data to test their expectations.[8] Gates, while proposing a detailed account of the motivations of rebel joiners, does not provide empirical testing and admits that many variables in his argument are immeasurable.[9]

To date, two possible solutions to this problem exist. First, researchers could use data more appropriate for micro-level arguments. Cunningham *et al.*, for example, take the importance of non-state actors seriously when modeling civil war as a dyadic phenomenon between a state and a rebel actor.[10] The authors investigate the effect of rebel strength, group location, and alternative means of participation on civil war duration. Explaining the level of violence during civil wars, Heger and Salehyan include measures of rebel strength to account for rebel characteristics.[11] Yet a shortcoming of this approach is that it does not allow studying civil war onset – how can one know *ex ante* which group will rebel against the state? Also, since the onset and duration of conflict may not be independent events, such analyses may suffer from selection bias. Data collected by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project provide another possible alternative, as they allow one to model empirically interactions between the state and minority groups. Since not all internal conflict is ethnically motivated, however, this approach might leave out a large number of potentially relevant cases.

A second solution suggested by Sambanis is to use case studies to develop and test micro-level theories.[12] Case studies, Sambanis claims, can help identify causal mechanisms, detect measurement problems, discover new variables and highlight interactive effects between variables neglected in statistical models.[13] Collier and Sambanis, for example, present a two-volume collection of case studies that provides a systematic application of the Collier and Hoeffler model of civil war onset.[14] Also, Kalyvas explores the logic of violence in civil wars at the individual level.[15] In his argument, actors use selective violence because it functions as a powerful deterrent, as it creates the perception that actors can monitor and sanction behavior. Using selective violence, however, is costly since it requires verifying collaborators' information. Random violence, while less difficult and costly to use, cannot induce compliance. It is therefore used only when selective violence is infeasible. A combination of quantitative and qualitative data on the Greek civil war is used to test his arguments, and results show that the type and level of violence used varies as a result of change in actors' control over territory.

Thus, a focus on individual cases allows for an understanding of the dynamic and strategic nature of civil war and does not constrain its focus to variables that change little or not at all over time. However, a drawback of this approach is the limited generalizability of case studies. In this paper, I follow Sambanis's advice and analyze the role of opposition groups by studying two individual cases.[16]

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

While opposition groups could in principle challenge the government's authority by resorting to violence at any given time (especially in authoritarian regimes), there are situations in which bargaining between actors is more likely to occur. Since this paper focuses on strategic interaction between government and opposition groups, existing research that identifies such conditions is particularly relevant for developing an argument on the role of opposition groups in civil war. The literature on regime change shows how bargaining over power is usually induced by a crisis of the regime in power.[17] When the government's authority is threatened by a critical event such as an economic crisis or a defeat in war, authoritarian regimes are likely to offer concessions or initiate liberalization to accommodate other groups in society. Following such liberalization, intense bargaining over the future distribution of power is likely to occur. For opposition groups, such weakening of government authority presents a unique opportunity to bargain for greater influence in future governments.

However, despite the opportunity presented by liberalization, opposition groups will encounter credibility problems when faced with political liberalization initiated by the authoritarian regime. Based on the opposition's expectation to participate in future governments, it has an incentive to renege on agreements in order to itself gain hegemonic control of the state. Emboldened by the concessions offered by the incumbent regime, opposition movements may attempt to secure power to enact favorable policies and programs. While opposition groups would like to negotiate a settlement over future influence, they can use this increased bargaining power by reneging on agreements in later interactions with the government.

The authoritarian leadership may fear that granting concessions to opposition groups could result in greater opposition demands in the future or even hegemonic control by the opposition. The opposition, therefore, must find ways to signal credibly its willingness to negotiate, and to deflect the government's fears over future demands or a takeover of control. Critical for this analysis is the credibility of opposition groups during liberalization. Which types of movements will be able to credibly signal their commitment to cooperation with the incumbent regime?[18]

A difficulty in identifying different types of opposition groups is that much of the existing literature on opposition groups and parties focuses on consolidated democracies, neglecting that such groups exist and operate in non-competitive regimes. While in some regimes these groups function clandestinely and are excluded from the political process, other authoritarian regimes allow for the presence of legal opposition parties. Research has only recently begun to investigate opposition groups in authoritarian regimes. In an analysis of democratic experiments in Africa, Bratton and Van de Walle construct a measure of opposition cohesion to investigate the prospect for democratization.[19] The authors find that greater cohesion among opposition groups increases the probability of democratic success. Howard and Roessler investigate the importance of opposition coalition building in their analysis of elections leading to greater liberalization and find that coalitions positively contribute to liberalizing outcomes.[20]

It is argued here that the organizational structure of opposition groups will affect their ability to cooperate when the government initiates liberalization. Groups with cohesive, developed organizational structures are expected to signal more credibly their commitment to a regime with shared powers. This is because opposition groups are often divided into moderate and radical challengers, and groups without developed organizational structures cannot limit radicals' demands. Lacking the institutional strength to punish defectors, weakly organized groups cannot deflect the regime's fear of greater demands in the future. Groups without clear leadership or a cohesive organization cannot signal resolve to a negotiated settlement, thus hindering the prospect for cooperation.

In a comparison of Belgium's and Algeria's democratization, Kalyvas finds that the presence of a hierarchical, centralized challenger party in Belgium deflected fears of a radical takeover of the old regime.[21] Conversely, Islam's decentralized, vertical organizational structure led to competition between radical and moderate forces within the opposition during Algeria's short experiment with democracy in the early 1990s. Quandt points to leadership struggles within the Islamist movement, where the rhetoric of Islamist leader Ben Hadj 'seemed considerably more extreme than Madani's.'[22] Fearful that the opposition movement would renege on its commitment to a democratic regime and establish an Islamist state, the military canceled election results and took up arms against the Islamists.

This intuition is consistent with insights from the study of ethnic conflict, where only strong, hierarchical organizations that can effectively police extremists succeed in inducing compromise for cooperation. Pointing to the relative prevalence of interethnic cooperation, Fearon and Laitin argue that the organizational structure of groups plays a crucial role for the outbreak of conflict.[23] Groups with dense social networks and interactions allow for in-group policing, and radicals threatening interethnic cooperation can be identified and sanctioned. Yet when institutional arrangements allowing for in-group policing are absent, defection can lead to the breakdown of cooperation in the form of spiraling violence.

In addition to the organizational structures emphasized above, links to existing social institutions can further enhance the credibility of opposition movements. Ties to established institutions such as churches or unions make compromise more likely as they provide additional credibility and legitimacy to a movement.[24] Such linkages can signal to the government that moderates are in control, as existing institutions tend to ally with forces that will maximize their political impact.[25]

The Polish Solidarity movement, for example, had a strategic partnership with the Catholic Church, which lent legitimacy to the movement.[26] Collaboration with the Catholic Church, a hierarchical, conservative, and risk-averse institution, signaled that moderate forces were in control, and thus helped to reduce Communists' fears of radical demands. Conversely, opposition groups lacking ties to other institutions, such as the Islamist movement in Algeria's regime transition, cannot convincingly commit to power-sharing and democracy. Islam's structure is 'loose and decentralized with no clergy, and religious discourses and idioms compete on several levels.'[27] The movement failed to establish linkages to pre-existing social

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

institutions and could not convince the regime that moderates were in control. Fearing an Islamist takeover of the state, the military canceled election results and the country descended into a long civil war. An analysis of social movements in Israel, South Africa, and Northern Ireland by Meyer comes to a similar conclusion.[28] The author finds that groups considering contact with existing institutions as neither feasible nor desirable were more likely to engage in violent protest activity.

Cohesive opposition groups with ties to existing organizations, therefore, are expected to be able to make credible commitments, and these characteristics consequently reduce the probability of civil war.

> H1: During political liberalization, states with cohesive, organized opposition groups are less likely to experience civil war.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The goal of this section is to test the theoretical argument developed above by conducting an in-depth analysis of actual cases. Following the method of 'focused, structured comparison' outlined by George, I analyze how the institutional features of opposition groups can affect their commitment abilities in two separate cases.[29] The purpose of the case comparison is to explain the occurrence of civil war as a function of opposition groups' institutional structure. To test the theoretical argument, cases must have experienced a period of political liberalization. As King *et al.* point out, non-random sample selection is appropriate in small-N analysis since random selection can easily fail to capture the full range of variation on the variables of interest.[30] To allow for causal inference, I chose cases that exhibit variation on the key independent variable of interest while other factors are held constant. This case selection strategy thus corresponds to a 'most similar systems' design.[31] For the purposes of this study, cases should show variation in the institutional structure of opposition groups (the key independent variable of interest), but should be similar in other respects.

Based on this logic, Algeria and Chile were selected for analysis. Both countries experienced liberalization in the late 1980s. As laid out in the theoretical argument, the onset of political liberalization can lead to commitment problems between government and opposition. In Algeria, discontent over growing inequality and unemployment culminated in a popular uprising in October 1988 and resulted in liberalization measures by the incumbent regime.[32] In Chile, a sharp economic downturn in 1982–83 put the military regime in a vulnerable position for the upcoming plebiscite over General Augusto Pinochet's continued stay in office.[33]

The cases are also similar with respect to other factors. Both countries were governed by military regimes when political liberalization occurred. Since achieving independence in 1962, Algeria was formally governed by a single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN, however, was never a party in the traditional sense, but 'in reality, and in the first place, an army.'[34] Following the collapse of democracy in Chile, the country was abruptly transformed into a military

regime, and coup leader Pinochet soon made it clear that he did not intend to return power to civilian rule.[35] In addition, while arguments on ethnicity expect that ethnic fractionalization increases the potential for violence, neither Chile nor Algeria exhibit significant ethnic divisions, and Algeria's civil war lacked an ethnic dimension.[36] Finally, economic arguments suggest that economic development and/or economic inequality influence the probability of civil war. Yet Algeria and Chile's level of economic development was similar at the time of the transition. Algeria's GDP per capita in the late 1980s was almost as high as Chile's.[37] In addition, Algeria's level of economic inequality was actually lower than Chile's in the later 1980s.[38]

The cases differ significantly, however, in the institutional structure of opposition groups. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the dominant opposition party, was marred by internal divisions and tensions between radical and moderate elements.[39] In addition, the FIS failed to establish coalitions with other opposition parties.[40] Opposition leaders in Chile, however, united behind a single goal and presented their coalition as a clear and unified alternative to the Pinochet regime.[41]

The empirical analysis proceeds as follows. For each of the two cases, I provide a discussion of historical events leading up to political liberalization. I then analyze how organizational features of opposition groups influenced the probability of civil war, the dependent variable of interest, in each case. Alternative explanations for outcomes in Algeria and Chile are discussed in the final section.

Political Liberalization in Algeria

Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962 after a six-year war fought by the FLN, a coalition of a variety of groups with a predominantly secular orientation. Yet the military's preeminent position as a decisionmaker became increasingly apparent in the mid-1960s, with the military leadership taking on a decisive role at critical moments. Installed by the military in 1978, Chadli Benjedid's time as president was marked by significant economic problems that turned into an increasingly explosive situation. Global oil and natural gas prices collapsed in the mid-1980s. With oil and gas exports constituting approximately 60 per cent of total revenue in the 1980s and 1990s, the effects of the price collapse were devastating for Algeria.[42] The government restricted imports, limited capital investment to projects already underway, and cut social services such as free health care and subsidies on food. These actions led to an increase in unemployment, reaching 26 per cent in 1986, created food shortages, and produced conditions ripe for social unrest.[43]

Once the effects of the economic crisis affected large parts of the population, localized protests and strikes started to occur sporadically. In October 1988, a large popular uprising forced the government to react. The government declared a state of emergency, sent in the army, and dissolved the protests with force. Surprisingly, however, the crushing of popular opposition was followed by a political opening unprecedented in Algerian history. At the FLN congress in November, President Benjedid pushed through a new constitution that established a separation of powers,

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

civil liberties, and freedom of expression, association, and assembly. In July 1989, a new law on political parties was issued, and 'by early 1991, over fifty had obtained official recognition.'[44] The FIS soon turned out to be the most popular of all opposition groups.

The Benjedid administration proceeded by scheduling municipal elections for June 1990, to be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections. The electoral law adopted by the government 'seemed designed to favor the largest party, presumably the FLN.'[45] However, in a stunning defeat, the FIS scored a resounding victory in the local elections. The FIS received 34 per cent of all votes cast, giving it a majority in local governments because of the skewed electoral rules. The results of the first round of parliamentary elections held in December 1991 mirrored the outcome of municipal elections. The FIS received 47 per cent of the vote, although a large number of spoiled and blank ballots showed that only 25 per cent of all eligible voters had supported the FIS.[46] Nevertheless, the victory gave the FIS a clear majority in parliament. Faced with a government takeover by an Islamist party, the military regime stepped in, canceled the election results, and banned the FIS. The regime's seizure of power was met with violent resistance by the Islamists, and Algeria soon descended into an eight-year civil war.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

Opposition Cohesion and the Probability of Civil War in Algeria

Prior to the 1980s, Islamic activists engaged in little open opposition or extra-institutional protest against the secular orientation of the Algerian regime. Rather, fundamentalist Islam was a 'variegated and nebulous movement on the fringe of political life.'[47] A small dissident group of *ulemas* formed in the early 1980s and became increasingly critical of the regime.[48] It was not until the 1988 protests, however, that the Islamist movement grew in strength. Two Islamic fundamentalists, Hachemi Sahnouni and Ali Belhaj, immediately recognized the opportunity to take advantage of popular discontent and further their message.[49] They recruited a prominent academic, Abassi Madani, who, together with Belhaj, would soon emerge as one of the leaders of the Islamist movement. In February 1989, they formed the Islamic Salvation Front. While the Benjedid administration had initiated political liberalization in late 1988, the FIS was officially recognized as a party after the law on the freedom of parties was passed in September 1989.

Formally, the FIS was governed by a hierarchical organizational structure. At the national level was the *Maljis al-Shura* (Consultative Council). The *Maljis al-Shura* had five dependent national commissions, and this structure was replicated at the administrative and communal level.[50] Yet information on the institution's composition or functioning is non-existent, suggesting that it was practically irrelevant. No statutes or regulations for its operation were published, and 'meetings were held in private at irregular times.'[51] The FIS never produced a list of official representatives in the *Maljis al-Shura*, nor did it lay out its decision-making procedures. In practice, supremacy was enjoyed by Madani and Belhaj, who officially were listed only as 'spokesmen.' The two leaders represented two very important albeit quite different constituencies of the FIS. Madani was a moderate,

western-educated university professor and represented the moderate and political wing of the FIS. Born in 1931 and part of an older generation of university graduates, he was 'willing to compromise with modernism.'[52] Originally a member of the FLN, he broke with the regime later in his life and established a strong Islamist presence at the University of Algiers.[53] Belhaj, on the other hand, was first and foremost a man of religion. Born in 1956, he was a high school teacher of Arabic and a lay preacher who represented impoverished, desperate, and mostly younger supporters of the FIS. Known for his fiery and militant rhetoric, he offered a radical critique of the western world and pursued a total overhaul of the Algerian state.[54]

The dual nature of the FIS leadership succeeded in appealing to a large number of Algerians. Small merchants, civil servants, and college graduates were the predominantly moderate constituency of the party. These groups struggled with the consequences of the economic crisis and sought an accountable and representative government. The other wing of the FIS was composed of young men suffering from increased unemployment. This duality, however, created serious problems for the party in signaling its intentions to the FLN and other groups in society. The contradictions and fissures within the FIS can be underlined by evaluating public statements of both leaders. In his speeches, Madani repeatedly stressed his party's commitment to democracy and the willingness to cooperate with other parties:

> Pluralism is guarantee of cultural wealth and diversity needed for development. Democracy, as we understand it means pluralism, freedom, and choice.[55]

> We will leave the word to the people. Whether we are in power or not, democracy means diversity, choice, and freedom. We have promised this, God willing, and keep our promise.[56]

Remarks made by Ali Belhaj starkly contrast with Madani's:

> We will not barter *shura* [consultation] for democracy. It is Islam which has been the victor, as always, not democracy. We did not go to the ballot boxes for democracy.[57]

> As for the secularists, pseudo-democrats, atheists, feminists, francophones, and other evil doers, the day we gain power, we'll put boats at their disposal which will take them home to their motherland, France.[58]

> When we are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be ruling.[59]

The ability of the FIS to appeal to diverse constituencies was also reflected in the party's lenient membership criteria. The FIS distinguished between sympathizers, supporters, and activists. It did not require sympathizers or supporters to renounce their association with other religious or political groups, nor did they have to follow the leadership's commands.[60] The FIS, in consequence, represented a variety of Islamic tendencies. As Roudjia points out, 'the FIS must be considered a melting-pot

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

for very diverse factions which have little more in common than Islam and the desire to put an end to a political situation in Algeria.'[61] Yet, as with the contradictions inherent in the party leadership, this inclusiveness came at a price. The unity of the FIS was precarious because it rested on an alliance of a diverse collection of forces.

Apart from tensions apparent in the party organization and leadership, the FIS also failed to produce a coherent agenda. The party never published a detailed program and publicly only made bland assurances of restoring prosperity and order. The closest the FIS came to an official program was the presentation of a 15-point platform in April of 1990. The points were rather vague and mostly political in content. Only three points were Islamist in nature, including a call for *sharia*, a moderate proposal regarding the role of women, and a demand for educational reform in line with Islamist thought. Traditional values of Islamist movements were 'veiled in the blandest possible language and introduced very low down on the list.'[62] Lacking a coherent program and cohesive party organization, contradictions soon appeared in the FIS's policy positions. First, the FIS abandoned its initial opposition against 'godless Baathism' and embraced a pro-Iraqi position during the First Gulf War. While this decision was supported by the moderate wing of the party, it weakened Madani's position relative to the strictly Islamist element on other issues. Second, influenced by its moderate wing, the FIS had endorsed liberal economic policy, which was essentially the position of the FLN since Benjedid. This position, however, meant that the FIS had little different to offer to the urban poor it claimed to represent. In need of a radical political project to divert attention from this issue, the FIS repeatedly stated its intent to establish an Islamic republic once elected to power.[63]

In addition, the FIS did not develop ties to established social institutions such as unions or religious organizations. This failure, however, is most likely the result of circumstances outside the FIS's control. First, the FLN under Boumedienne had successfully co-opted all independent social institutions, including unions and student organizations. Tight control by the authoritarian regime made it impossible for the FIS to establish such linkages. Second, the absence of ties to religious organizations stems from the nature of Islam rather than the FIS's intent. Sunni Islam lacks a religious hierarchy and is egalitarian in nature.[64] The FIS, therefore, could not improve its credibility by establishing linkages with existing institutions.

After the FIS won a majority of seats in municipal elections in June 1990, the tensions between radical and moderate elements in the party became increasingly eminent. Councils now controlled by the FIS suspended mixed education in schools, prohibited the sale of alcohol, limited the ability of women to work and instructed them to wear the veil, and banned popular music festivals. Yet at the same time, the moderate wing restated its commitment to democracy and good relations with the West. Madani declared: 'Algeria is not Iran, or Saudi Arabia. All we want is a return to our traditional values.'[65] Parliamentary elections held in December of 1991 resulted in another FIS victory. Algeria was now faced with a government takeover by a group that had failed to clearly establish its commitment to democracy. The military regime cancelled election results, and used force against the Islamists.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

Did the FIS cooperate with other opposition groups during Algeria's experiment with democracy? The FIS clearly dominated the opposition, but over 50 parties registered after the passage of Algeria's law on parties in July 1989. Among other opposition parties, one important distinction is between religious and secular parties. There were two religious opposition parties of national importance. First, the Hamas party under Mafhoud Nahnah was an Islamist group close to the Egyptian-based Muslim brotherhood. Second, Abdallah Djaballah, who had organized Islamist student protests in Constantine, founded his own party An-Nahda. Both parties were relatively moderate, but with a clearly Islamist message and goals similar to those of the FIS. Why did these parties fail to cooperate with the FIS and unite against the regime? Roberts suggests that the FIS itself brushed such competitors aside out of fear of inhibiting 'its confrontational posture vis-à-vis the FLN.'[66] Incorporating these parties would have weakened Madani's and Belhaj's leadership position within the FIS and threatened the outlook and posture of the party towards the regime. Another explanation is suggested by Tahi, who argues that Hamas and An-Nahda 'were created by the regime in order to split the Islamist movement.'[67] Similarly, Ciment suggests that the praise Hamas received for its moderate message 'led many to assert that Hamas is, in fact, a creation of the FLN.'[68] Both parties failed to garner a significant number of seats in municipal and parliamentary elections and had little influence thereafter.

Two secular parties, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), played a role nationally. While both parties had clear regional strongholds in the Berber-dominated part of Algeria, they competed nationwide in municipal and parliamentary elections. While the FFS had maintained a commitment to democratic values, it appealed mainly to ethnic Berbers. The RCD was a strongly nationalist party that promoted cultural nationalism in the Berber region with little appeal for Arab Algerians. Non-fundamentalist voters that did not want to support the FLN thus had few options to consider during Algeria's short experiment with democracy. All other relevant opposition groups were suspected of collaborating with the FLN regime, thus leaving people with few electoral choices. It is a subject of debate whether these suspicions originated in the FIS in an attempt to weaken its competitors, or whether they truly were satellites of the incumbent regime. What is evident, however, is that the lack of cooperation between opposition groups was clearly detrimental for the opposition's position relative to the government.

Taken together, the above discussion of the FIS's organizational structure highlights how internal divisions contributed to the occurrence of violence in the Algerian case. The party's leadership and public support was divided into a moderate and a radical wing and lacked an organizational entity that could resolve conflicts between the two. As Kalyvas notes, this outcome is in part an unfortunate consequence of Islam's egalitarian nature.[69] Quandt similarly argues that 'there is no single interpretation of what Islam requires of its followers. As has been frequently noted, there is no formal hierarchy in Sunni Islam, nothing comparable to the papacy as a source of infallible interpretation.'[70] Absent a strong, hierarchical religious authority, the FIS represented a mix of divergent interpretations of Islam. Some of

its currents were moderate, some radical, but the party lacked an organization that could force it to speak with one voice. In addition, the lack of cooperation between the FIS and other opposition parties seriously weakened the opposition's credibility as a viable alternative to the FLN regime. Finally, the absence of ties to existing institutions further put the FIS's credentials into question, which may have influenced the military's decision to intervene and cancel election results.

Democratization in Chile

Increasing polarization in the Chilean party system contributed to the democratic breakdown in 1973. Supported by a tenuous coalition between leftist parties and Christian Democrats, Allende assumed the presidency in 1970. After Allende passed a series of redistributive economic measures that increased inflation and led to economic problems, opposition against his leadership by the Right had become so intense that conflicts increasingly spilled on the streets. When congressional elections held in the same year yet again failed to produce a decisive victory for either of the competing blocs, the armed forces stepped in and a military junta took power.[71]

The military declared a state of emergency and held mass raids. An estimated 1,500 people died in the months after the coup.[72] In 1974, General Augusto Pinochet was selected as president of the Junta and named president of the Republic the same year. He quickly consolidated his position within the army by retiring officers that were suspicious of him and promoting others loyal to his rule. By 1977, Pinochet had created a *tabula rasa* in the institutional, economic, and political spheres of the country, and wanted to complement it with a new constitution. The military, nevertheless, felt the need to create a semblance of legality and subjected the constitution to a national referendum.[73]

The referendum revealed almost 70 per cent of popular support for accepting the constitution, providing a boost to the military regime. Opposition groups – forced to operate clandestinely – had failed to offer workable alternatives and remained beset by the divisions that had led to the breakdown of democracy. The collapse of Chile's economy in the mid-1980s, however, triggered a protest movement that led to the reassertion of political parties. In the months prior to the 1988 referendum outlined in the constitution, 13 opposition parties formed an alliance named Concertación. To the surprise of many, particularly within the government, voters rejected Pinochet with a margin of 54.7 per cent to 43.0 per cent.[74] Yet the military still controlled the armed forces, and as Valenzuela describes, the opposition 'feared that they might renege on the promise of holding free and open presidential elections if they felt overly threatened.'[75] To encourage compromise, the opposition accepted the 1980 constitution, but negotiated a set of amendments to remove some of its undemocratic features.

In response to this defeat, the Pinochet regime adopted an electoral formula tailored to favor its supporters in the upcoming elections. Yet the same coalition of parties united behind a single slate of candidates for congressional and presidential elections. The Concertación's candidate won the presidency and the

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

coalition won a majority in the House. General Pinochet accepted the outcome of the plebiscite and elections, at least in part because he did not have to fear for his immediate survival. The 1980 constitution guaranteed him continued powerful influence, as it allowed him to remain commandant of the armed forces and head of the army.[76]

Opposition Cohesion and the Probability of Civil War in Chile

Prior to the military coup in 1973, the Chilean party system was characterized by a three-way division among parties on the left, the center, and a conservative but democratic right. Christian Democrats represented the political center, and Communists and the Socialist Party were the most important groups among leftist parties. Parties on the right identified closely with the coup and reacted favorably to the establishment of military rule. As a result, rightist parties ceased to exist as organizations once the military took over power. The imposition of a political recess on parties had major consequences for the parties on the left and Christian Democrats.

Leftist parties, which had constituted Allende's government coalition, were the ones most heavily repressed by Pinochet's regime. Many leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties had fled into exile, and many of its remaining members were jailed, tortured, or killed. The Socialist Party experienced the most significant leadership and programmatic struggles after the coup. The party had suffered from internal divisions since its foundation in 1933. As Constable and Valenzuela write, they 'had been rent by disputes between members who favored reformist policies and an electoral route to power and those who advocated a violent overthrow of the "bourgeois" state.'[77] During Allende's three-year reign, competition between these two forces contributed to his government's difficulties. The militant sector was represented in the appointment of Carlos Altamirano as secretary general of the party, whereas party leader Clodomiro Almeyda stood as moderating force. After the coup, this division contributed to the emergence of several factions and consumed much of the energy of party leaders and followers. Combined with the harsh repression and fear of persecution by the Pinochet regime, the void created by dead and exiled leaders lasted for years. However, after a Communist assassination attempt against Pinochet failed in 1985, moderates within the Socialist Party eventually gained the upper hand. Ricardo Núnez, leader of the moderate wing, called for the 'construction of one great Socialist party' and pressed for a return to democracy.[78] This shift within the Socialist Party was crucial for the re-establishment of the party's internal cohesion and its participation in the coalition of parties that eventually succeeded in ousting the military regime.

The political center in Chile's political system was represented by the Christian Democratic Party. Generally, Christian Democrats enjoyed greater autonomy in their activities under authoritarianism than parties on the left. Their unique position was a function of the party's opposition against the Allende government, which they shared with the military regime. Valenzuela and Valenzuela write that the Christian Democratic Party's leadership initially supported the coup 'as the inevitable

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

outcome of what it saw as the Popular Unity government's errors, ambiguities, and creeping totalitarianism.'[79] Christian Democrats, however, never supported the regime's claim that the Chilean crisis was one of regime and society. By the mid-1970s, it became clear that the military was not willing to transfer authority to a civilian government in the foreseeable future, and the party leadership broke with the regime.[80] The government responded with increased repression against the party, and several of its leaders were killed or forced into exile. Nevertheless, oppression against the Christian Democrats never rose to the levels experienced by parties on the left. Strong ties with the Catholic Church and democratic parties in Europe provided it with a certain level of immunity and also contributed positively to the maintenance of the party structure. This allowed the party to renew its leadership, hold frequent meetings, and engage in consultation with party members, thus preserving its internal cohesion.

While the preceding section emphasizes how developments in the internal structure of Chile's key opposition parties contributed to organizational cohesion, relations between them were also important for the opposition's ability to present itself as a unified, viable, and credible alternative to the Pinochet regime. In the years immediately after the coup, opposition parties were marred by the polarization and discord that had led to the breakdown of democracy. In 1983, a sharp economic downturn triggered a spontaneous protest movement that resulted in a *rapprochement* of opposition parties. A shared history of oppression by the military regime combined with the economic downturn reduced the historic divide between Socialists and Christian Democrats. The two parties formed the Democratic Alliance, which called for an immediate return to democracy. In 1985, the same parties joined forces in the National Accord for the Transition to Democracy. While both attempts failed to materialize, they nevertheless underlined parties' newfound capacity to cooperate.

The upcoming plebiscite on Pinochet's continued stay in office (as mandated by the 1980 constitution) put opposition parties in a difficult situation. In particular, Socialists were divided on whether the plebiscite presented a valuable tool for popular mobilization, or whether participation would simply further legitimize the regime. Yet after the failed assassination attempt against Pinochet, radical forces calling for a violent overthrow were increasingly sidelined. Eventually, all opposition groups except the Communists decided to participate in the referendum.[81] Some smaller parties registered first, followed by Christian Democrats and Socialists. Constable and Valenzuela write that 'by 1988, Socialist groups were actively committed to the No campaign – and working together for the first time in ten years.'[82]

In the run-up to the referendum, the key problem for opposition groups was to unify their disparate forces and reassure the regime (and voters) of their willingness to bring about peaceful, democratic change. In early 1988, a coalition of 13 parties formed the Concertación for the No. Participation in the alliance ranged from conservative rightist groups to Christian Democrats in the middle to Marxist parties on the far left. This broad spectrum of parties gave the coalition increased coherence and credibility. The coalition for the No vote emerged victorious in the plebiscite.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

Yet its success in the referendum meant that the coalition needed to transform itself into a coalition that could actually govern. The Concertación had to unite behind a consensual candidate for president and agree on single slates for congressional seats.[83] After lengthy negotiation, parties on the left agreed to nominate Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democratic Party, as the Concertación's presidential candidate. In exchange, leftist parties were promised ample representation on Senate and Chamber tickets. The Communist Party presented an additional obstacle for opposition forces. Its refusal to participate in the coalition had the potential to undermine the opposition's united electoral front. Yet in the end, Communists and the Concertación agreed to run a single master slate. Communists would compete separately in a number of races in return for supporting the coalition's candidates elsewhere. In his final appearance before the presidential election, presidential hopeful Aylwin asserted the Concertación's message: 'Never again will our differences convert us into enemies.'[84] Aylwin won the election with 55 per cent of the vote, and the Concertación dominated Chilean politics over the next 20 years.

In addition to the internal organization of parties and the cooperation between them, ties with existing social institutions also contributed to the credibility of Chile's opposition coalition. Many have emphasized the important role played by the Catholic Church in Chile's transition to democracy.[85] The church's initial collaboration with the military regime provided it with a degree of insulation from assaults against other groups when its position shifted against Pinochet. The Catholic Church took over important functions previously provided by collapsed social institutions and created a host of institutions to support its activities. One such institution was the Vicariate for Solidarity, which provided legal defense against human rights violations. Others were soup kitchens, neighborhood organizations, mothers' clubs, and the like.

Among the political parties, Christian Democrats had the closest ties to the Church hierarchy and thus benefited the most from the institutional networks provided by the Church. Constable and Valenzuela describe how the Church allowed 'party leaders to behave as if they were respected professionals, maintaining a solid party structure and creating institutes to keep research and debate alive.'[86] Christian Democratic party leaders and the Church's Cardinal Fresno also became key facilitators of the emerging compromise between political parties, which eventually led to the acceptance of the National Accord.

Yet the Church's involvement in human rights and social issues also led to closer identification of the working class with the Church. Members of leftist parties were the main victims of persecution by the regime, and the Church's role in the prosecution of human rights violations created important ties with supporters of Communist and Socialist Parties. This collaboration of Christian Democrats and sympathizers of leftist parties in Church-sponsored programs made important contributions to reconciliation between both groups. As Smith points out, 'such a process of practical cooperation is paving the way to greater mutual respect across party lines, respect that was sadly lacking in the last months of the Allende

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

regime.'[87] Ties with the Catholic Church, therefore, contributed to the peaceful outcome of the Chilean transition. The hierarchical structure of this organization contributed to the development of a unified, cohesive, yet moderate opposition against the Pinochet regime.

To conclude, developments within the Socialist Party contributed to greater party cohesion, which opened up the door for cooperation with Christian Democrats and other parties. The emergence of a cohesive, unified coalition signaled the opposition's credibility to the Pinochet regime and facilitated Chile's peaceful transition to democracy. In addition, ties with the Catholic Church contributed to the moderate position of the coalition and lent additional legitimacy to the movement.

Alternative Explanations

Are there alternative explanations that account for the divergent outcomes in the cases as well as or better than the argument put forward here? Variables known to increase the probability of civil war such as regime type, economic factors, and ethnicity were similar in both cases and therefore cannot explain variation in the dependent variable. However, objections might be raised with regard to the Islamist nature of Algeria's opposition. The compatibility of Islam with democracy is still the subject of debate. However, there are examples of Islamist parties that have participated in elections and even taken on mandates peacefully. One recent case is the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which won a majority in the 2002 elections.

Related to this point, one might argue that Chile's long experience with democracy and the absence thereof in Algeria drove the outcomes in both cases. Yet contradicting this argument is the fact that Chile experienced a violent takeover by a military regime not long before its return to democracy. The coup resulted in more than 1,000 deaths over a few months in late 1973. While prior experience with democracy has long been established as an important variable for democratic success, democracy alone seems insufficient to avoid the onset of violence. In particular, the absence of precisely the conditions contributing to Chile's peaceful transition in the late 1980s had led to democracy's violent breakdown 17 years earlier. Polarization between parties on the left, center, and right had resulted in democracy's collapse. Yet when party leaders put past divisions aside and formed a unified and cohesive opposition to the regime, a peaceful return to democracy became possible.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

CONCLUSION

The analysis of opposition groups during Algeria's and Chile's transition processes reveals the influence of group cohesion on the probability of civil war. The theoretical section argued that cohesive and hierarchical groups are better at making credible commitments. Analyzing this concept in narrative detail shows support for the argument and also provides a more nuanced picture of the causal nexus.

During Algeria's experiment with democracy, the main opposition party suffered from internal divisions, organizational deficiencies, and the lack of a clear program.

The FIS was unable to define itself as a unified and credible alternative to the authoritarian regime. Internal contradictions, in addition, made it difficult for the party to achieve cooperation with other opposition parties, which would have increased its potential to form a coherent and credible coalition against the government. Finally, the party did not develop ties to existing social institutions. This failure was partly a result of successful cooptation of social organizations by the military regime and partly a function of the decentralized nature of Sunni Islam. When the FIS scored surprise victories in municipal and parliamentary elections, the government feared that radical elements would soon take over and establish an Islamist state. The military thus canceled election results and attempted to re-establish control by using force.

In the Chilean transition to democracy, parties were able to overcome divisions and polarization that had brought the country to the brink of civil war in the early 1970s. Socialist groups, long beset by internal tensions, united behind a moderate message after a failed coup attempt on Pinochet's life. This development opened up the door for negotiations with the Christian Democrats. Parties in the center and on the left eventually formed a united, cohesive coalition against the military regime. Moreover, party ties to the Catholic Church also facilitated the emergence of a unified opposition. The Church, while traditionally closer to the Christian Democrats, attracted Socialists because of its engagement in human rights issues. The hierarchical structure of the Church organization also helped moderate the Socialist position.

The case studies also provide a more nuanced understanding of the theoretical concept. In particular, the cases show the consequences of internal divisions within parties on the probability of cooperation between them. Evidence from both countries suggests that intra-party frictions reduce the ability of inter-party cooperation. In Algeria, competition between a moderate and a radical wing within the FIS limited the party's ability to collaborate with other groups. Similarly, cross-party bargaining in Chile was difficult until tensions within the Socialist camp were resolved. A more comprehensive data collection effort on opposition groups, in particular with respect to the number of parties, their key organizational features, and the consequences of these features on the interactions between them would be valuable.

The paper makes two contributions to existing work on civil war. First, the paper investigates the role of opposition groups in civil war, which is often neglected in existing research on internal violence. Second, the paper expands upon Kalyvas's research on religious parties in emerging democracies by showing that the organizational features of opposition groups matter outside a religious context.[88] Kalyvas investigates how the cohesiveness of religious parties affects their credibility by comparing two cases where such parties have received electoral mandates. He argues that religious challengers suffer from greater credibility problems since their program includes the rejection of liberal democracy as a principle. It is, however, plausible that the cohesion of opposition forces, whether religious or not, will influence their credibility when faced with the opportunity of gaining control of the state.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

The goal of this paper was to demonstrate the importance of the organizational structure of opposition groups on the onset of violence. The analysis of Algeria and Chile lends support to the theoretical argument, showing that organized, cohesive groups are better able to make credible commitments. Future studies of civil war, therefore, could benefit from greater emphasis on the role of opposition groups.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association Meeting, New Orleans, LA, 8–10 January 2009, and the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association Meeting, New York, 15–18 February 2009. I am grateful to R. William Ayres, Christine Day, Michael Huelshoff, David Lektzian, Amy Poteete, Brandon Prins, Marc Rosenblum, Peter Rudloff, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

NOTES

1. The argument draws on work by James D. Fearon and David Laitin, 'Explaining Interethnic Cooperation', *American Political Science Review* 90/4 (1996) pp.715–35; and Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'Commitment Problems in Emergent Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties', *Comparative Politics* 32/4 (2000) pp.379–99.
2. The theoretical argument developed in this paper could in principle be applied to a much larger set of countries. However, studying the role of opposition groups in civil war onset using large-N statistical analysis is difficult because it is not known in advance which actor will challenge the state. Therefore, the empirical test conducted here focuses on two cases.
3. For examples of such arguments see James D. Fearon, 'Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?', *Journal of Peace Research* 41/3 (2004) pp.275–302; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97/1 (2003) pp.75–90; and Paul Collier and Anke E. Hoeffler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004) pp.563–95.
4. In practice, the distinction between government and opposition actors is not always clear-cut. For example, opposition groups in authoritarian regimes may be co-opted by the state or, especially in corporatist regimes, exhibit statist features. See Howard J. Wiarda, 'Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Framework for Analysis' in Howard J. Wiarda (ed.) *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Boston, MA: U of Massachusetts P 1974), pp.199–230. The discussion of opposition parties in Algeria and Chile reflects on this imprecision when appropriate.
5. See James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', *International Organization* 49/3 (1995) pp.379–414.
6. Scott Gates, 'Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/1 (2002) pp.111–30.
7. See Stergios Skarpedas, 'Warlord Competition', *Journal of Peace Research* 39/4 (2002) pp.435–46. A similar emphasis on opportunity can be found in Fearon and Laitin (note 3) pp.79–82, and Collier and Hoeffler (note 3) pp.564–70.
8. Fearon and Laitin (note 3); Collier and Hoeffler (note 3).
9. Gates (note 6) p.128.
10. David Cunningham, Kristian S. Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, 'It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53/4 (2009) pp.570–97. The term dyadic in conflict studies refers to the interactions between pairs of actors (such as two states, a government and an opposition group, or two non-state actors).
11. See Lindsay Heger and Idean Salehyan, 'Ruthless Rulers: Coalition Size and the Severity of Civil Conflict', *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2007) pp.385–403.
12. Nicholas Sambanis, 'Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies', *Perspectives on Politics* 2/2 (2004) pp.259–80.
13. Ibid. p.260. While the trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative approaches are well established in the literature, scholars increasingly perceive these approaches as complementary rather than

antithetical. For an example see Sidney Tarrow, 'Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide' in Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds) *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004) pp.171–81. Increasingly, research combines quantitative and qualitative research to maximize the leverage of empirical tests.

14. Collier and Hoeffler's (note 3) model is applied in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume 1: Africa; Volume 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions* (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications 2005).
15. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006).
16. Sambanis (note 12).
17. See for instance Josep M. Colomer, *Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 2000).
18. A possible objection to this argument is that opposition groups may not have a true interest in sharing power. While it is certainly true that liberalization may result in the establishment of an authoritarian regime, a crisis of the regime means at least temporary uncertainty over the future distribution of power where neither actor can immediately prevail. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1991) p.73 points to the indeterminate outcome of regime transitions. A strengthened opposition may intend to establish a broadened dictatorship in the future, but cannot simply seize power without bargaining in the present.
19. Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1997).
20. Marc Morje Howard and Philip G. Roessler, 'Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes', *American Journal of Political Science* 50/2 (2006) pp.365–81.
21. Kalyvas (note 1).
22. William B. Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 1998) p.58.
23. Fearon and Laitin (note 1).
24. A possible objection is that the effect of such linkages will depend upon the nature of the respective institution. North's work on institutional stability, however, suggests that institutions are generally status-quo oriented. See Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1990) pp.83–92. Consequently, it is unlikely that pre-existing social organizations would establish linkages with extremist groups. In addition, the appeal of radical groups stems at least in part from marketing themselves as 'anti-establishment' alternatives to existing, more moderate groups and organizations. For example, research by Adams *et al.* shows that extremist parties that moderated their positions are punished at the polls (see James Adams, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garrett Glasgow, 'Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976-1998', *American Journal of Political Science* 50/3 (2006) pp.513–29). Therefore, I expect that links to established institutions function as a signal of moderation.
25. This point draws on Kalyvas (note 1), see especially p.391.
26. See Guglielmo Meardi, 'The Legacy of "Solidarity": Class, Democracy, Culture and Subjectivity in the Polish Social Movement', *Social Movement Studies* 4/3 (2005) pp.261–80.
27. Kalyvas (note 1) p.389.
28. Megan Meyer, 'Organizational Identity, Political Contexts, and SMO Action: Explaining the Tactical Choices Made by Peace Organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa', *Social Movement Studies* 3/2 (2002) pp.167–97.
29. Alexander L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Theory of Structured, Focused Comparison' in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.) *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (New York: The Free Press 1979) pp.43–68.
30. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sydney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1994) p.139.
31. See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1970) pp.31–47.
32. For a summary of events leading to Algeria's civil war see Miriam R. Lowi, 'Algeria, 1992–2002: Anatomy of a Civil War' in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds) *Understanding Civil War: Volume 1, Africa* (Washington, DC: World Bank 2004) pp.221–47.
33. For a description of Chile's transition to democracy see Arturo Valenzuela 'Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy' in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn and Juan J. Linz (eds) *Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1999) pp.191–242.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

34. Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002. Studies in a Broken Polity* (London: Verso Books 2003) p.40.
35. Valenzuela (note 33).
36. Algeria's ethnic fractionalization index is at 0.43, its religious fractionalization at 0.01. Chile's index on ethnic fractionalization is at 0.14, the religious fractionalization index at 0.19. While Algeria's degree of ethnic fractionalization is slightly higher than Chile's (with Berbers being the most significant minority), Lowi (note 32) points out that Algeria's civil war was fought between Arabs, thus lacking an ethnic dimension.
37. Algeria's per capita GDP in 1988 is $4,345 compared to Chile's $4,684. Data comes from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1, and are available online at <http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php> accessed 6 Aug. 2009.
38. Chile's GINI index for 1988 is 54.5, compared to Algeria's at 39. Higher numbers indicate greater inequality.
39. Several analyses of the Islamic Salvation Front highlight this tension. For a detailed analysis see Hugh Roberts, 'From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition. The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979-1992' in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds) *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*: *The Dynamic Character of Movements* (Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P 1994) pp.428–90. See also James Ciment, *Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge* (New York: Facts on File 1997); Quandt (note 22); and Kalyvas (note 1).
40. See Roberts (note 39); and Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War 1990–1998* (New York: Columbia UP 2000).
41. Valenzuela (note 33); also see Marcelo Cavarozzi, 'Patterns of Elite Negotiation and Confrontation in Argentina and Chile' in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds) *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1992) pp.208–37.
42. Lowi (note 32) p.226.
43. Quandt (note 22) p.47.
44. Ciment (note 39) p.51.
45. Quandt (note 22) p.51.
46. Ibid. p.60.
47. For a discussion of Islam's role in Algerian politics prior to the 1980s, see Mohammed Hafez, 'From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria' in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP 2004) pp.61–88; and Roberts (note 39) p.439.
48. Although the state had a monopoly on the organization of religion, the dissidents subverted it by establishing 'free mosques' outside the government's control. After independence, the state had built a large number of mosques, yet lacked imams to properly staff them. Since many of these mosques remained unfinished, the state did not claim authority over them, and dissident *ulemas* took over more than 2,000 such mosques by the mid-1980s. For more detail see Roberts (note 39); Quandt (note 22); and John P. Entelis, 'Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian Politics in Algeria' in John Ruedy (ed.) *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1994) pp.219–51.
49. Ciment (note 39) p.92.
50. Roberts (note 39) p.448.
51. Ray Taykeh and Nikolas Gvosdev, *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger 2004) p.45.
52. Ciment (note 39) p.94.
53. Hugh Roberts, 'Doctrinaire Economics and Political Opportunism in the Strategy of Algerian Islam' in John Ruedy (note 48) pp.82–124.
54. John P. Entelis, 'Civil Society and the Authoritarian Temptation in Algerian Politics: Islamic Democracy vs. the Centralized Strate' in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.) *Civil Society in the Middle East*, vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1995) p.67.
55. Taykeh and Gvosdev (note 51) p.46.
56. Reuters, 16 June 1990.
57. *Le Monde* 17 Jun. 1990.
58. Quoted in Catherine Lloyd, 'Multi-Causal Conflict in Algeria: National Identity, Inequality, and Political Islam', Queen England's House Working Paper Series 104, p.15.
59. As quoted in Taykeh and Gvosdev (note 51) p.46.

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009

60. Séverine Labat, *Les Islamistes Algériens: Entre les Urnes et le Maquis* (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1995) p.187.
61. Ahmed Roudjia, 'Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986–1991)' in Laura Guazzone (ed.) *The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World* (Reading, UK: Ithaca 1995) pp.74–75.
62. Roberts (note 39) p.455.
63. Ibid. p.456.
64. Ciment (note 39) p.74; Quandt (note 22) p.102.
65. *The Economist* 4 Aug. 1990 p.31.
66. Roberts (note 39) p.450.
67. Mohand S. Tahi, 'Algeria's Democratisation Process: A Frustrated Hope', *Third World Quarterly* 16/2 (1995) p.209.
68. Ciment (note 39) p.95.
69. Kalyvas (note 1).
70. Quandt (note 22) p.102.
71. In addition, US efforts to undermine the Allende government contributed to an atmosphere of confrontation. See Valenzuela (note 33) p.220.
72. The estimates are from the Organization of American States, Commission of Human Rights, *Informe Sobre la Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en Chile* (Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1985).
73. For more detail on Chile's democratic breakdown see Timothy R. Scully, 'Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile' in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds) *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 1995) pp.100–38.
74. Ibid. p.124.
75. Valenzuela (note 33) p.231.
76. More details on the transition to democracy in Louis Hecht Oppenheim and Silvia Borzutzky (eds) *After Pinochet: The Chilean Road to Democracy and the Market* (Gainesville, FL: UP of Florida 2006).
77. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet* (New York: Norton 1991) p.282.
78. Ibid. p.294.
79. Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Party Oppositions under the Chilean Authoritarian Regime' in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (eds) *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1986) p.208.
80. Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.282.
81. The decision on whether to participate was hotly debated within the Communist Party. When party officials reiterated the need to pursue a violent overthrow of the regime in a meeting, Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.302 quote a rank and file member's objection as follows: 'An election is a form of a struggle too, and we feel we must do everything possible to defeat the dictatorship.'
82. Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.301.
83. For more detail see Cesar N. Caviedes, *Elections in Chile: The Road Toward Redemocratization* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1991) p.56; and Manuel Garreton, 'Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile, 1973-1980' in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (note 79) p.269.
84. Cited in *La Epoca* 11 Dec. 1989, p.12.
85. On the role of the Catholic Church see Manuel Garreton (note 83) pp.259–77; Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela (note 79) pp.184–230; Brian H. Smith 'Old Allies, New Enemies: The Catholic Church as Opposition to Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1979' in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (note 79) pp.270–304; William M. Lies, 'A Clash of Values: Church–State Relations in Democratic Chile' in Oppenheim and Borzutzky (note 76) pp.64–93; and Constable and Valenzuela (note 77).
86. Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.283.
87. Smith (note 85) p.293.
88. Kalyvas (note 1).

Downloaded By: [Daxecker, Ursula E.] At: 19:26 28 September 2009