

Perilous Polities? An Assessment of the Democratization-Conflict Linkage¹

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While evidence continues to mount that democracies resort to military force reluctantly, the transition to democracy may in fact be a dangerous and conflictual one. Given the emphasis now being put on democratization, a reassessment of the relationship between the stability of domestic institutions and interstate conflict seems fitting. To date, the evidence remains mixed. No clear consensus has emerged on whether regime transition either increases or decreases conflict propensities. Employing a logit specification with splines and robust standard errors, this research analyzes the conflict behavior of transitioning states for the 1950–2000 period. The results indicate that ‘rocky’ transitions or democratic reversals increase the likelihood of conflict occurrence. I demonstrate, however, that this result is driven by the conflict behavior of autocratizing countries. An interaction term shows that although regime change itself may increase conflict propensities, such exacerbating effects are reversed for democratizing states.

KEY WORDS ♦ democratization ♦ international conflict ♦ regime transition

Introduction

In recent years, many Western democracies have adopted strategies in their foreign policies that emphasize the promotion of democracy. The fostering of democracy has been an explicit goal of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy since the early 1990s. Democracy is a requirement for countries to be considered for European Union membership. Thus, the Union plays a major role in shaping the domestic policies of Eastern European candidate countries. The EU also presses democracy in its external assistance programs. Human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance

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represent elements the EU considers in defining allocations for individual countries. EU High Representative Javier Solana summarized the conventional wisdom of modern democratic states when he stated: 'Our common mission is to defend and expand the boundaries of stable, durable and peaceful democracy; to share with others the rights and opportunities we enjoy.'² Similarly, the Bush administration lists the promotion of democracy as a strategic goal of US foreign policy. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice recently emphasized the need 'to create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system'.³

The expectation of democratic peace shared by Western policy-makers has its origin at least in part in the findings of academic research. Democracies, it seems, rarely fight each other and this relationship extends over at least two centuries of international relations (Bremer, 1992). The last decades have also been evidenced by an increasing number of democracies in the world. Among the first to make the transition were the southern European countries Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1970s. These were then followed by a number of democratic transitions in Latin America starting in the late 1970s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent democratization in Eastern European countries mark the peak in these developments. Combined with the empirical findings of pacificity in democratic foreign policy, this third wave of democratization should be reason to expect an increasing number of states committed to more peaceful forms of conflict resolution (Huntington, 1991).⁴

Unfortunately, the road that leads to democracy may not be a peaceful one. Stable democracies may avoid conflict, but the process of regime change remains inherently dangerous. Transitions are periods of great instability. Old elites feel threatened in their positions of power and may at times resort to violence to avert regime collapse. Organized opposition may emerge in transitional polities and contest not only the party in power, but the regime itself. Further, democratization may unleash ethnic conflict as elites wrap themselves in the flag in the face of weak institutions. If regime change frequently engenders violent interstate conflict, then the policies of western democracies could actually exacerbate current international tensions.

This study re-examines the relationship between regime change and interstate conflict. Does democratization push states away from violent confrontation even in the short term, or does regime change bring with it heightened probabilities of interstate conflict?⁵ Since the historical record presents both violent and peaceful political transitions, what factors enable certain states to transit towards a stable and peaceful political equilibrium? As policy makers actively support democratization, the answers to these questions are obviously pertinent. A more complete understanding of regime transition will, one hopes,

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enable political elites to craft policies that encourage a smooth and peaceful path towards democracy.

This article expands earlier research by Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) and Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) on the impact of regime transition on conflict onset. First, a theoretical argument based on the informational properties of democratizing states is developed. Second, this research investigates the combined effect of magnitude and direction of change on conflict occurrence. Through the use of an interaction term, I demonstrate that the conflict increasing effect of regime change is driven by the behavior of autocratizing states. Finally, an updated set of cases provides observations from 1950–2000, enabling a post-Cold War assessment. A model controlling for both cluster and temporal dependence finds that change towards democracy decreases the propensities of conflict onset, while democratic reversals increase the probability of militarized attacks. These results lead me to conclude that states transitioning to democracy exhibit more peaceful foreign policy behavior.

Democracy, Transition and Conflict

While evidence for a democratic peace remains robust in the face of recent theoretical and empirical challenges, transitions to and away from democracy potentially tell a different story. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, violent conflict occurred in several of the 15 newly independent states. Georgia's regime transition, for example, was followed by the election of an openly nationalist president in 1991. Gamsakhurdia seized dictatorial powers and propagated exclusionary nationalism favoring ethnic Georgians.⁶ These actions exacerbated existing tensions with its minorities and the country was soon involved in violent interstate disputes with Russia in Abkhazia. Similarly, newly independent Moldova experienced violent conflicts in the Transnistria and Gagauz regions immediately following its regime transition. On the other hand, the Ukraine and the Baltic republics underwent relatively peaceful and consistent transitions to democracy. The Ukrainian government, for example, was able to peacefully settle disputes with the Crimea, a region primarily populated by ethnic Russians. The centrist coalition supporting the new president Kravchuk pursued a policy that avoided alienating Russia by granting substantial autonomy to the Crimea, but insisted on the Ukraine's sovereignty and independence.

This evidence, while admittedly anecdotal, suggests a complex picture. What factors explain the seemingly puzzling fact that both the Ukraine and Georgia experienced regime transitions with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities and little prior democratic experience, but nevertheless resulted in different foreign policy outcomes? Although all polities in transition face a

set of challenges rarely encountered by more stable democratic states, some countries succeed in settling them peacefully. How can we explain such divergent outcomes? The above illustration suggests that volatility and reversals in the structures of authority as in the Georgian case may lead to increased conflict propensities; whereas consistent movement toward democracy may help reduce the use of force at home and abroad, such as in the Ukraine. A more complete understanding of the specific nature of transition processes is thus undoubtedly necessary to better explain the relationship between contested domestic institutions and interstate conflict.

Two areas of research are particularly important for this question. When looking at democratization, one has to consider the work on the democratic peace. There is strong and consistent evidence that democracies do not fight each other. In addition, a large amount of scholarly work shows increasingly more ways in which regime type impacts a state's conflict behavior at the monadic, dyadic, and systemic levels of analysis. Second, how do these results relate to the foreign policy behavior of transitioning states? Does the democratic peace extend to democratizing states as well? Some work suggests that democratization increases the risk of war, whereas other research shows that change to democracy can reduce states' conflict propensities.

The Liberal Peace

Liberal ideology grounds the democratic peace. What defines democracy, basic freedoms of speech, press, and religion, coupled with elected and accountable leaders and a general tolerance for different viewpoints, explains expectations of non-violence and mutual compromise between democratic nations. Political leaders in democracies rely on the consent of civil society, a fact emphasized in the political philosophy of Kant: 'If the consent of the citizens is required to decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war' (Kant, 1957 [1795]: 13).

Scientific research has generated mixed support for the Kantian expectation at different levels of analysis. As Ray (2001) points out, empirical relationships do not need to be consistent across different levels of analysis. Different correlational or causal relationships may be in place for different units of analysis, and researchers have to be careful when making inferences across different levels of analysis (Ray, 2001: 364).⁷ When investigating pairs of states, studies have shown strong and robust support for the notion that democracies rarely fight against each other (Bremer, 1980, 1992; Levy, 1988; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Oneal and Russett, 1999). Recent extensions also confirmed the validity of this finding for militarized interstate disputes, showing that democratic pairs do not fight each other (Russett and

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Oneal, 2001). Besides, democratic leaders select the conflicts they get involved in more carefully since they are accountable for the decision to use force and thus, they win a disproportionate share of the wars they fight (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). Democratic elites know that their position depends on successful policy; as such, they are also inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort. This also increases the probability of winning wars (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999).⁸ Finally, jointly democratic dyads involved in disputes choose more peaceful methods of settlement than other pairs of states (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997; Dixon, 1994; Mousseau, 1998; Raymond, 1994).

Yet when analyzing the conflict behavior of democracies in general, less evidence for a pacifying effect has been found.⁹ Early research by Rummel (1983, 1985) showed that democracies are less war prone in general, yet the time frame used was short. Studies at the monadic or nation-state level initially focused on the frequency of conflicts for the different regime types and did not find a significant difference between democratic and autocratic states (Chan, 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Small and Singer, 1976; Weede, 1985).¹⁰ A shift in scholarly attention from a mere occupation with frequency to more specific analyses of the willingness and circumstances in which democratic states fight wars has generated some support for a monadic democratic peace. Using a negative binomial model, Benoit (1996) finds that democracies are significantly less likely to use force. Rousseau et al. (1996) find support for the contention that 'democracies are less likely to initiate crises with all other types of states'. Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) show that democracies are generally very unlikely to engage in war except in the situation of protracted high-tension disputes.

Explanations for the peace proneness of democratic states focus on norms, institutions or informational arguments. Normative or cultural arguments emphasize the emergence of liberal norms within democracies that translate into a different foreign policy behavior. Decision-makers 'will try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as they have developed within the domestic political process' (Russett, 1996: 96). In addition, democratic leaders expect the same tendency toward peaceful methods of conflict resolution by other liberal democracies, thus uncertainty between democratic states is greatly reduced. The second part of the argument suggests a dyadic democratic peace, whereas the first part implies that democratic states in general are more peace prone. The normative theory, however, fails to explain the extent of a change in the foreign policy behavior of democratic states. It remains unclear if changed behavior pertains to other democracies only or to non-democracies as well.

Institutional explanations, as put forward by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2003) criticize the norms argument as being ad hoc, inductive and unable to

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explain wars fought by democracies against substantially weaker states. The argument of Bueno de Mesquita et al. aims to account for the finding that democratic leaders are more likely to be replaced following wars (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). The authors point out that the selectorate as well as the winning coalition tend to be larger in democracies.¹¹ This confronts democratic leaders with a greater need to distribute public goods, which in turn reduces their incumbency advantage when facing re-election. To avoid policy failures and removal from leadership, they will therefore be more careful in selecting the wars they get involved in, spend more resources, and fight harder when engaging in military confrontation.

A third strand of literature focuses on the informational properties of democracies as factors limiting conflictual behavior, suggesting that 'democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can' (Fearon, 1994: 577). Similarly, Schultz (2001) suggests that the threats issued by democratic leaders generate important information on the government's resolve. More specifically, the support of using force by opposition parties is thought to transmit crucial information to opponents in Schultz's (2001) model. All three theoretical accounts limit their analysis to stable, mature democracies. Yet, the ability of nascent democratic institutions to serve as constraints on decision-makers and to effectively confirm the credibility of tacit signaling may be significantly undermined in transitioning polities.

Transitioning States

The findings on the democratic peace stand in partial contrast to the findings on democratization and war. Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005), for example, conclude that whatever is true for consolidated democratic regimes does not hold for states in transition to democracy. Using Polity II data (Gurr, 1989), Mansfield and Snyder (1995) find transitioning states to be more war prone than stable states. Surprisingly, they observe transitions towards democracy to be particularly conflictual, although states undergoing high change from democracy to autocracy have the highest probability of war involvement. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) distinguish between democracies, anocracies, and autocracies by establishing thresholds for these regime types.¹²

Thompson and Tucker (1997) replicate the study by Mansfield and Snyder (1995), but cannot confirm Mansfield and Snyder's (1995) positive relationship between democratization and war. They point out that Mansfield and Snyder's statistical tests do not allow one to distinguish between democratization and autocratization, and therefore we cannot determine which is related to war. Applying more appropriate statistical tests, Thompson and Tucker (1997) find strong evidence that democratization is independent from war occurrence,

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whereas 'autocratization, when compared to no regime change, is significantly related to war involvement' (Thompson and Tucker, 1997: 445).¹³

In response to critiques, Mansfield and Snyder (2002a, 2005) reanalyze their data, now differentiating between complete and incomplete transitions to autocracy or democracy, as well as linking the transition process to institutional strength. Specifically, the authors test for interactive effects between four regime change dummy variables and the degree of concentration of domestic authority, their measure of institutionalization (2002a, 2005).¹⁴ They expect that institutional weakness coupled with a transition to incomplete democracy makes countries especially conflict prone. Results indicate that incomplete democracies are more war prone when domestic authority is at its lowest. Yet, very few cases of incomplete democratization for low authority scores exist in the data, and the authors do not provide measures of uncertainty for this interactive relationship.¹⁵

Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) develop more refined measures of polity change for the 1816 to 1992 period.¹⁶ Rather than establishing categorical distinctions for polity change, Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) instead use the change scores themselves. Using continuous measures for polity change and variance, plus a dummy distinction for direction of change, Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) find a significant and negative relationship between overall change towards democracy and war onset. This suggests that democratization decreases conflict propensities, although this result does not hold if democratization occurs during an ongoing war, which provides some support for the dangerous democratization hypothesis (Gleditsch and Ward, 2000). Interestingly, though, direction of change is positively related to war, which arguably contradicts their finding that larger changes toward democracy are associated with smaller probabilities of war involvement. These contradictory results may be due to the fact that the authors include two variables measuring direction of change in one model, which leads to multicollinearity problems and makes type-II errors more likely. Gleditsch and Ward (1998) further observe uneven or 'rocky' transitions to be especially war prone. Countries that have high variance in change scores show increased conflict probabilities.¹⁷

At the dyadic level, Enterline (1998a) finds that change to autocracy in a dyad member results in increased conflict initiation rates, while the effects of transitions to democracy or autocracy are not statistically different from zero. Oneal and Russett (1999) investigate the relationship between a dyad member's regime change and militarized interstate disputes for politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1985. These authors test for the impact of change toward a coherent democracy (and autocracy, respectively) on conflict and do not find a significant relationship.¹⁸

In a replication of Oneal and Russett (1999), Mansfield and Snyder (2002b) use a different operationalization of regime change but keep Oneal

and Russett's (1999) control variables. They assess the impact of incomplete and complete transition processes on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) at the dyadic level. In contrast to the findings of Oneal and Russett, the authors show that incomplete democratization in one or both of the countries comprising the dyad increases the likelihood of a MID. This is consistent with their earlier, monadic findings on democratization and war (see Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a), but contrasts with other findings of the (dyadic) democratic peace, since they do not find a significant relationship for complete democratization or autocratization and MIDs.¹⁹ Diehl and Goertz (2000) show that rivalries in transition, regardless of the direction of polity change, are especially war prone. Yet, the fact that they look at countries that already are in some form of conflictual relationship combined with the low number of cases limits the generalizability of this result.²⁰

Evidence on the relationship between regime transition and conflict thus remains mixed. Some findings show no relationship between democratization and conflict (Thompson and Tucker, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Enterline, 1998a), while others observe positive or negative relationships between democratization and conflict (Gleditsch and Ward, 1998, 2000; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005). Some evidence points to the specific nature of the transition process as a determinant of conflict such as high variance in regime scores (Gleditsch and Ward, 1998, 2000).

I will now discuss theoretical explanations of the relationship between regime transition and the occurrence of interstate conflict. After analyzing Mansfield and Snyder's 'dangerous democratization' hypothesis, I will turn to explanations brought forward by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000). Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) and Snyder (2000) argue that newly democratizing states suffer from weak institutions together with a rapid expansion of the electorate. This creates a climate in which belligerent nationalism will likely emerge as a dominant ideology. The reason is that threatened elites may appeal to nationalist sentiment and in turn use force abroad to divert the public's attention from the contestation of power in the domestic sphere. Elites take the risk of war initiation as a 'gamble for resurrection'; hoping that 'foreign policy confrontations will help them avoid losing power' (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a: 304).

Yet this argument makes some underlying assumptions not addressed by the authors. First, it assumes that the opportunity for the external use of force exists, such as an external threat or an ongoing conflict that can be initiated or joined. Second, it takes for granted that democratizing states (characterized by institutional weakness) possess sufficient political and military power to engage in foreign aggression. It is doubtful that elites in democratizing states are powerful enough to obtain the support over forces such as the military which will be crucial for the use of force abroad. Third, it can be argued

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that the use of force is only one of several options leaders may choose. Enterline and Gleditsch (2000), for example, maintain that political elites may equally use repression when confronted with domestic vulnerability. Power-seeking elites in states undergoing political liberalization may use increased repression which could lead to quick reversals to autocracy. Fourth, while their theoretical argument focuses on dispute initiation, empirical results for war initiation as the dependent variable are inconsistent with the argument, showing that complete democratization increases the chance of war initiation (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005).²¹

Gleditsch and Ward's (1998, 2000) expectation of the conflict behavior of transitioning states focuses on theories proposed for the peace among stable democracies. They argue that support for increased aggression among democratizing states suggests a logical inconsistency between findings at the mature versus nascent democracy stage. The authors, as an extension of existing theories of the democratic peace, expect that 'greater change toward democracy will be associated with decreased likelihood of war' (Gleditsch and Ward, 1998: 55). However, they agree with Mansfield and Snyder (1995) that highly volatile transitions may lead to higher conflict propensities. In addition, the authors speculate that 'political instability and disorder may encourage attacks from other countries' (Gleditsch and Ward, 1998: 53).

One theoretical account of democratization and war emphasizes the intensifying effect of domestic vulnerability on the likelihood of interstate conflict in democratizing states (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Snyder, 2000). A second explanation, brought forward by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) argues that volatility in fact does increase conflict likelihood; yet such impact is not found for democratizing states, which the authors attempt to explain as an extension of theories for the liberal peace.

Theoretical Expectations

Research by Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) and Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) shows that regime change itself, given the uncertainty and instability that denotes these processes, may increase conflict propensities. Institutional weaknesses and the lack of deepened, liberal norms (combined with rising levels of mass participation) in unconsolidated democracies may lead threatened elites to appeal to nationalism and in turn resort to violence (Snyder, 2000). Yet it is by no means clear that such mechanisms occur in democratizing states only. Leaders in newly autocratizing states will as well depend on public support for the new regime, and thus use diversionary moves to suppress domestic consent. High degrees of uncertainty and instability might provide incentives for conflict initiation by leaders of transitioning states, or invite aggression from abroad in the midst of institutional weakness.

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Therefore, countries undergoing volatile transitions to democracy or autocracy may have increased probabilities of conflict occurrence.

Informational approaches (Eyerman and Hart, 1996; Fearon, 1994; Partell and Palmer, 1999; Prins, 2003; Schultz, 2001) emphasize the importance of regime type in situations of crisis bargaining.²² States that incur audience costs when entering international disputes are expected to have superior abilities to demonstrate resolve and send credible signals. Since elites in democratic countries are accountable to the public, and foreign policy failure might lead to removal from office, it is a costly signal when they initiate or escalate international disputes. These signals provide important information to the opponent and reduce uncertainty in crisis situations. Empirical applications of Fearon's model (Fearon, 1994) have indeed shown support for the ability of democratic states to credibly signal their foreign policy preferences in crisis situations (Eyerman and Hart, 1996; Partell and Palmer, 1999; Prins, 2003; Schultz, 2001).

Applying this logic to transitioning states, it suggests that the conflict probability of states undergoing regime changes depends on the effect of the transition on their signaling abilities.²³ States that experience highly volatile transition processes will not be able to credibly signal their foreign policy preferences. Democratic reversals greatly increase uncertainty about a state's preferences. Thus, countries sliding back and forth between democracy and autocracy are less efficient in sending credible signals, and security concerns among contiguous states may increase. This is consistent with evidence showing that states with unstable or transitional political competition are more likely to reciprocate militarized disputes and, in addition, are more likely to engage in escalatory behavior (Prins, 2003). Similarly, studies of diversionary behavior have found that domestic vulnerability and instability leads to the initiation of force abroad (Dassel and Reinhardt, 1999; Miller, 1999). Countries moving consistently toward democracy or experiencing great change toward democracy, however, might have similar signaling abilities as consolidated democracies. Institutional reform and expansion of the electorate that proceeds in a measured manner is expected to enhance the credibility of signals sent by political elites in democratizing states. Conversely, I expect that autocratizing regimes have a greater likelihood of experiencing conflict (Enterline, 1996, 1998b; Thompson and Tucker, 1997). This is consistent with Miller (1999), who argues that the difficulty in estimating the willingness of autocratic elites precludes the prudent constraint of potential adversaries that marks the relationship with democratic leaders.

First, a signaling argument anticipates that high variance in democracy levels increases a state's conflict propensities. Democratic reversals increase uncertainty about a country's preferences and makes signals less reliable since a stable democratic opposition is absent at the domestic level. Potential adversaries of

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highly unstable regimes cannot accurately estimate the preferences of political elites and therefore fail to anticipate attacks over issues that could otherwise be solved through non-violent means.

Hypothesis 1: Countries experiencing democratic reversals have higher conflict propensities.

Second, both informational and normative/institutional approaches suggest decreased conflict propensities for states moving steadily toward democracy. Deepening democracy results in increased decisional constraints on elites and strengthens the development of democratic norms. In consequence, this will foster progress toward real opposition parties and contested, competitive elections, and enhance signaling abilities. Such constraints will diminish the likelihood of diversionary moves by political leaders. I test this argument with an interaction term between magnitude of change and direction of change. This will allow me to discern the mechanisms of magnitude of change, and the direction of change more closely.

Hypothesis 2: Large change toward democracy lowers the likelihood of conflict onset.

Research Design

Methodology

The analysis covers the period from 1950 to 2000 and includes all countries that are members of the state system as defined by the Correlates of War project.²⁴ Pooled cross-sectional time-series (TSCS) data are well suited to study the dynamics of change over time in different units. With these data, the assumption of independence of observations across space and time is easily violated (Sayrs, 1989). I follow Beck et al.'s (1998) advice for the analysis of TSCS data with a binary dependent variable and introduce temporal spline variables into the logit regression models. This method recognizes that TSCS are 'identical to grouped duration data' (Beck et al., 1998: 1264), whereas an ordinary logit analysis fails to allow for temporal dependence in the likelihood of event occurrence. The research here is conducted at the monadic level, such that the unit of analysis is the nation-state in a given year.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this analysis is measured as militarized interstate dispute onset (Goshn and Palmer, 2003). Data for MIDs come from the Correlates of War 2 MID 3.1 dataset.²⁵ This variable takes a value of either 0 or 1, a value of 1 indicating that a MID occurred in a given country-year, 0 otherwise.

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Independent Variables

Regime Change Variables. For regime change, I rely on earlier work by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000).²⁶ The data for democracy and autocracy scores are derived from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).²⁷ I test for the impact of regime change on conflict onset, initiation and targeting. Four separate regime change variables are constructed (see Table 1).

The first variable measures the variance in democracy-autocracy scores. This variable measures whether countries go through regime reversals and allows me to test Hypothesis 1. I calculate the variance in democracy-autocracy scores for each country over the past 10 years. I take the natural log of variance since the variable is highly right-skewed. Countries that are sliding back and forth between democratization and autocratization are hypothesized to have higher conflict propensities.

Table 1
Summary Statistics for Regime Change Variables

Variable	Variable Description	Descriptive Statistics	Calculation
Variance	Variation in polity scores for the past 10 years, logged	$Range = 0.6-4.4$	$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \left(x_{i,t} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{t=1}^n x_{i,t} \right)^2$
Absolute Change	Absolute change in polity scores over 10 years	$\bar{x} = 1.5$ $Range = 0-19$	$x_{i,t} = abs(x_{i,t} - x_{i,t-10})$
Direction of Change	Dichotomous variable measuring change toward democracy, 1 for democratizing countries, 0 otherwise	$\bar{x} = 2.8$ $Range = 0,1$ $Mode = 0$	$x_{i,t} = \leq x_{i,t-n} \Rightarrow 0$ $x_{i,t} = > x_{i,t-n} \Rightarrow 1$
Change* Direction	Interaction term, absolute change and direction multiplied	$Range = 0-19$ $\bar{x} = 1.8$	

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The second variable measures absolute change in democracy level over the past 10 years.²⁸ The combined democracy-autocracy score is used to calculate this change variable.²⁹ I take each current democracy-autocracy score and subtract the score of 10 years before from the current value. This returns empirical values from -17 to 19.³⁰ I then transform all values into absolute numbers to grasp the *absolute* amount of change in a given period, regardless of whether the change was toward democracy or autocracy.³¹

Third, I create a dummy variable coded 1 for change toward democracy and 0 otherwise. This variable measures change toward democracy only. The total change values for the past ten years (ranging from -17 to 19) are transformed into a dichotomous measure.

The fourth variable is an interaction term between the dummy variable for direction of change and the absolute change variable to measure magnitude and direction of change more precisely. A significant and negative result for this interaction effect would support the hypothesis that change toward democracy reverses the conflict-exacerbating effects of regime transition itself. However, because of theoretical and methodological reasons, I include the variable measuring absolute change and the interaction term in a separate model. Theoretically, absolute change and variance in democracy levels will not vary independently from each other. Countries having high changes in absolute numbers will also have high variance scores. This theoretical concern was confirmed by a test for multicollinearity between the two variables, with a correlation exceeding 0.84.

Control Variables. The inclusion of several control variables known to affect conflict propensities is aimed to avoid omitted variable bias. First, the political composition of a regime's neighborhood has been shown to affect conflict behavior (Enterline, 1998b; Gleditsch, 2002). States that are surrounded by democratic states engage in more peaceful democratic foreign policy behavior, and states in such 'zones of peace' are also more likely to democratize in the first place (Gleditsch, 2002).³² I measure the degree of democracy in a regime's neighborhood by calculating the average polity score for contiguous states. The second control variable measures countries' involvement in civil wars; a dichotomous measure coded 1 for a civil war onset in a given country-year. Data are derived from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Since this analysis focuses on the effects of domestic instability on external conflict behavior, it seems important to control for the presence of a civil war. Third, power is a strong predictor of conflict behavior. A state's power is measured using the Correlates of War CINC score, which is the combined index of national capabilities.³³ Data on national capabilities come from the COW 2 data (Singer et al., 1972; Singer, 1987) using the 3.0 update. I take the natural log of the CINC score because the variable is highly right-skewed. Finally, higher numbers of neighbors are known to lead to increased levels of

interstate conflict (Vasquez, 2000). Contiguity data come from COW and measure the total number of states bordering by land and 400 miles of open water (Stinnett et al., 2002). This variable counts the number of neighbor-states for each system member.³⁴

Data Analysis

I employ a logistic regression with natural cubic splines and Huber/White standard errors to model dispute onset (a dichotomous variable). The logit coefficient represents the effect of an increase in the independent variable on the log odds of an increase or decrease in the dependent variable. The first model tests the expectation that states experiencing democratic reversals have a higher likelihood of conflict onset. However, because of high collinearity between the variables measuring variance and absolute change, absolute change and the interaction term are not included in this model. In the second model, the magnitude, direction and interaction variables are included, along with the conflict controls.

The first model generates support for the first hypothesis (see Table 2). As expected, variance of change is positively related to conflict occurrence, indicating that countries experiencing democratic reversals have higher rates of conflict onset. This finding is consistent with Gleditsch and Ward (1998). The predicted probability of MID occurrence increases from 0.26 to 0.33 when variance is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above (everything else held constant), representing a 27% increase.³⁵

The dummy variable measuring democratization is not significant in the first model. Yet the specification in this model does not test for the effect of large changes toward democracy on the likelihood of MID onset, as emphasized in Hypothesis 2. Among the control variables, results confirm findings in previous research. The variable measuring the degree of democracy in states' neighborhoods is negative and significant, indicating that states surrounded by democratic neighbors are less conflict prone (Gleditsch, 2002). If the democratic neighborhoods variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one above, the probability of conflict onset increases from 0.27 to 0.33 (a 21% increase).³⁶ In addition, the importance of a variable controlling for internal conflict is well supported. Countries experiencing civil wars have a 77% greater probability of experiencing violence abroad, holding everything else constant. Military capabilities and the number of borders also have a significant and positive effect on conflict onset.

The second model examines the relationship between direction of regime change and conflict likelihood more closely. The results suggest some important amendments from the evidence gained in the first model. The expectation of

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Table 2
Logit Regression Estimates for Probability of Militarized Interstate Dispute
Onset 1950–2000

Variable	Onset Model 1	Onset Model 2	Marginal Effects Model 1	Marginal Effects Model 2
Variance	0.157*** (0.043)	—	+0.073	—
Direction of Change	-0.059 (0.102)	0.25** (0.114)	—	— ^{a, b}
Absolute Change	—	0.031** (0.012)	—	— ^{a, b}
Change * Direction	—	-0.046** (0.019)	—	-0.012 ^b
Neighborhood	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.02*** (0.007)	-0.057	-0.049
Civil War	0.904*** (0.105)	0.840*** (0.095)	+0.21	+0.193
Power	98.96*** (13.65)	112.33*** (14.51)	+0.285	+0.323
Contiguity	0.456*** (0.092)	0.51*** (0.077)	+0.11	+0.12
Constant	-110.41 (15.01)	-125.09 (15.95)	—	—
	N=3164	N=4132		

Note: Coefficients are estimated using logit regression with natural cubic splines and Huber/White standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates for three cubic splines are not reported. Columns three and four represent the change in the probability that $Y=1$, fluctuating the significant variables from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above all at one time, holding all other variables at mean values (or mode for dummy variables).

^a Marginal effects are not calculated for the main effects of the interaction since they do not vary independently.

^b The variables measuring direction, absolute change and the interaction term are varied together from the minimum to the respective maximum to calculate the marginal effect, since the standard deviation of absolute change is greater than the mean.


*** $p < .01$

** $p < .05$

a negative relationship between large change toward democracy and conflict occurrence is confirmed. This supports Hypothesis 2, which expected that the effects of great changes are opposite for democratizing and autocratizing countries. The interaction term is negative and significant at the 0.01 level, showing that democratizing countries that experience large changes toward democracy have decreased conflict onset rates.³⁷

Figure 1 shows that large change toward democracy decreases conflict likelihood, whereas strong movement toward autocracy increases the chance of military disputes.³⁸ The predicted likelihood of military conflict for autocratizing states goes from 0.29 to 0.41 if main effects and the interaction term are varied over their whole range (holding all else constant), which equals an increase of 41%. On the other hand, change toward greater democracy decreases conflict proneness as predicted. Thus, countries experiencing large, substantive change to democracy exhibit more peaceful foreign policy behavior. Setting all other variables at their means, the likelihood of conflict decreases by 28% from 0.32 to 0.25 (main effects and the interaction variable are moved from minimum to maximum). Results for control variables are consistent with the previous model.

Figure 1
Effects of Democratization and Autocratization on Conflict Onset



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As an illustration of the increased conflict propensities of autocratizing states, consider Uganda's foreign policy after the military coup in 1971. Idi Amin's 1971 coup in Uganda led to a 14-point drop in polity scores to a score of -7 , resulting in the establishment of a harsh autocratic regime. In the years between 1971 and 1978, the new Ugandan leadership initiated 12 militarized interstate disputes, mainly against its neighbor Tanzania, which finally resulted in an outright war in 1978. Amin's seizure of power strained previously peaceful foreign relations with Uganda's neighbors, and the new autocratic leader pursued an aggressive foreign policy. His dictatorship relied on a narrow coalition with the military, and severe repression together with the expulsion of the Asian elite led to an economic disaster in the mid-1970s (Khadiagala, 1993). With the annexation of 710 square miles of Tanzania's territory, Amin hoped he 'would divert from army mutiny and the erosion of central power in Kampala' (Khadiagala, 1993: 238). Although such anecdotal evidence should be regarded with caution, it supports the statistical results showing that autocratic leaders, especially in newly autocratizing regimes, engage in more aggressive foreign policy behavior.

To ensure that results are not driven by the control variables employed, I specify separate models including the regime change variables only. Results are presented in Table 3 in the Appendix and closely resemble the findings in the full model discussed above. For the model including variance and democratization, increases in variance make conflict onset more likely. In the model including the interaction term, we again observe the conflict-reducing effect of large change toward democracy. The coefficient for the interaction variable is significant and negative. The similarity of results shows that findings are not a function of model specification or particular control variables included (Ray, 2003).

Thus, the results presented here suggest an important addition to existing theories of democratization and war. It is shown that substantial change to democracy significantly lowers the risk of conflictual foreign policy behavior. As democracy deepens and strengthens, rates of initiation decrease. Findings on increased conflict propensities of states undergoing reversals are in part reconcilable with Mansfield and Snyder's (1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) findings that inconsistent or limited movement toward democracy may increase conflict propensities. Political liberalization that is soon followed by reversal increases conflict likelihood, as shown here. However, my findings contrast with Mansfield and Snyder's (1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) lack of support for increased conflict propensities for autocratizing states. Since their research does not measure volatility or instability per se, their results cannot differentiate between the destabilizing effects of regime change itself and the direction and magnitude of such changes.

Conclusion

Policy-makers in the European Union and the United States emphasize the promotion of democracy as an important foreign policy goal. Such a goal is based on the belief that democracies engage in more peaceful foreign policy behavior.³⁹ Empirical evidence indeed supports this notion, suggesting that democracies do not fight each other and that they are generally less conflict prone than non-democracies, although findings for the latter are somewhat more mixed. Theoretical arguments explaining the peace proneness of democracies center on norms, constraints or informational explanations. Consolidated democracies are expected to be less conflict prone because of deepened norms, constraints on political elites and superior abilities to credibly signal their foreign policy preferences. Yet findings from the democratization literature at least indirectly challenge these conclusions. Incomplete transitions to democracy have been shown to be substantially more war prone than others (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005). Still, other research does not support the above conclusion and indicates decreased conflict propensities for democratizing states as well as stable democratic polities (Gleditsch and Ward, 1998, 2000).

The lack of theoretical explanations for the conflict behavior of transitioning states and the mixed empirical evidence both justify a reassessment. This research re-evaluates the relationship between regime transition and conflict onset employing variables measuring regime change that are similar to those of Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000). It is argued here that informational approaches provide a useful explanation of the relationship between regime change and the likelihood of conflict occurrence. First, a signaling argument suggests that states experiencing democratic reversals are more prone to experience conflict since rocky transitions increase the uncertainty about a state's foreign policy preferences and do not allow elites to accurately estimate the behavior of autocratizing states. This hypothesis is supported. Second, I expected that change toward democracy decreases conflict propensities. The growing importance of democratic institutions and norms will force political elites to consider audience costs when using military force. This expectation is upheld for states experiencing large, consistent change toward democracy. An interaction term shows that large changes toward more democracy reduce rates of dispute onset, whereas autocratization has the opposite effect.

This research contributes importantly to earlier work on democratization and conflict. First, I can account for the contradictory results for democratization in Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) by an improved variable operationalization. By breaking apart magnitude and direction of change, and interacting both variables, we can better assess the impact of regime change

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on conflict. As the results show, I find that large change to democracy reduces the likelihood of conflict onset for the post-World War II period. Second, earlier evidence that uneven transitions, or democratic reversals, increase conflict propensities is supported by my models (Gleditsch and Ward, 1998). Finally, I present separate models for the main variables of interest and full models with control variables. Results are consistent in both specifications, thereby increasing the confidence in robustness of results (Ray, 2003).

Two aspects merit future research. First, the dynamics between regime change, civil conflict, and interstate disputes remain underexplored. Regime transition almost always involves some sort of internal conflict (rebellion, protest, secessionist movements), yet why do some conflicts externalize? Are the causes of external diffusion rooted in diversionary motives of threatened elites, or do third parties intervene in ongoing internal conflicts? These questions call for a more specific investigation of the link between civil and interstate conflict in future research. Second, a closer look at the strategic environment that results in diversionary behavior by newly autocratic elites should prove valuable. A rivalry approach seems suitable to account for the specific international environment that enables such behavior for autocratizing elites.

The perilous politics, then, are countries that are strongly autocratizing and experience highly volatile transitions. The results presented here do not support the dangerous democratization hypothesis.

Notes

1. Previous versions of this article were presented at the Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago, 15–18 April 2003, and the ‘Journeys in World Politics’ workshop, University of Iowa, Iowa City, 28–31 October 2004. I thank Brandon Prins, Marc Rosenblum, Kelly Kadera, Patrick James, Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, Sara Mitchell, David Lektzian, Michael Huelshoff, all workshop and conference participants, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. Data and documentation for replication are available from the author upon request.
2. Speech delivered at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, 7 May 2003. <http://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/May0703SolanaSpeech.html>.
3. Condoleeza Rice ‘The Promise of Democratic Peace’, *Washington Post*, 11 December 2005. The current Bush administration extended strategies of democratization to military interventions forcing regime change abroad. This article does not address such externally imposed regime transitions.
4. However, Huntington considers potential setbacks to the recent wave of democratization. He argues that lack of past democratic experience, non-Western orientation, and insufficient economic progress could lead to reversals (Huntington, 1991: 290–316).
5. I focus on interstate conflict in this article. However, I include a variable for civil wars to control for the potential diffusion of internal conflict across borders.

6. Georgians were also the titular nation during the Soviet regime. The success of a nationalist leader after 1991 can be explained by the fact that the movement for Georgian independence was based on Georgian exclusionary nationalist ideas and excluded other minorities from participation (Jones, 1997).
7. I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.
8. Reiter and Stam (1998) further confirm these findings by showing that democracies fight more effectively because of better initiative, as well as superior leadership.
9. In addition, Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' has implications at the systemic level, indicating that the proportion of democracies in the world should reduce conflictual behavior. Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) find some support (though not conclusive) for a curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy and the occurrence of war. Mitchell et al. (1999) find evidence for a negative relationship between democracy and war as the percentage of democracies increases after 1945; however, the opposite effect is present for the period immediately after World War I. The authors argue that it may just take time for democratic norms to develop. Recent research suggests that indeed democratic norms seem to become more prevalent as the international system gets more democratic. Mitchell (2002) finds that as the proportion of democracies increases, the likelihood of third-party intervention in peaceful settlements among non-democracies increases as well. Thus, the growing number of democracies in the international system influences the dispute settlement behavior of both democracies and non-democracies. Crescenzi and Enterline (1999) investigate the relationship between increasing numbers of democracies and conflict at the regional, sub-system level, and argue that aggregating regional patterns may mask important relationships. Yet, systemic analyses to this date do not distinguish whether conflict is produced by democratic or autocratic states, since the amount of conflict is simply aggregated for all states (Ray, 2001: 367).
10. Morgan and Campbell (1991) found that that high degrees of political constraint on the executive (as in democratic countries) reduce the likelihood of war involvement for major powers. No support, however, was found for the same relationship among minor powers.
11. The term selectorate refers to the subset of the population required to choose the government's leadership, and the term winning coalition corresponds to the subset of the selectorate that endows the leadership with power (Buono de Mesquita et al., 2003).
12. This operationalization is problematic, especially since anocracy is an insufficiently defined and rather obscure construct. Omitted variable bias presents another limitation of their model. The authors fail to introduce variables that control for rival explanations, such as major power status, capabilities or contiguity. It should be noted, however, that recent research has put forward theoretical and methodological critiques of 'too many' control variables (Achen, 2002; Ray, 2003).
13. Thompson and Tucker (1997: 466) also make the criticism that 'empirically, the authority concentration variable is more characteristic of autocracies than democracies'. Thus, states with the same polity scores receive higher values in Mansfield and Snyder's interactions if they are more autocratic.
14. This measure for concentration of power, an 11-point index, was available in the Polity II data (Gurr et al, 1989). The indicator increases when participation is

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regulated or restricted, executive recruitment is regulated, selection of executives follows institutional procedures, few constraints on the chief executive exist, executives are individuals rather than collectives, and when states are unitary and centralized (Gurr et al., 1989: 27–8). Note that four of the six component measures in the concentration measure are also used to calculate autocracy and democracy scores. It is therefore questionable whether concentration of power qualifies as an independent measure of institutionalization, since four components of the concentration variable are present in the indicators used to create Mansfield and Snyder's (2005) regime change variables. Furthermore, the concentration of power variable was dropped in subsequent versions of the Polity data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002: 35–6).

15. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) correctly point out that positive and significant coefficients for incomplete democratization indicate the effect of such transitions on war likelihood when domestic authority concentration is equal to zero. The authors 'expect the likelihood of war to be greatest under these conditions' (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005: 97). Yet the data include only 11 cases (out of 10,105) in which domestic concentration is equal to zero, and no cases of regime transition are recorded when domestic concentration equals zero (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005: 111, fn.15). The mean value of domestic concentration for cases of incomplete democratization is 5.2, therefore making Mansfield and Snyder's (2005) expectation an empirically rare scenario. In figures presenting predicted probabilities of war likelihood, cases of incomplete democratization show higher conflict probabilities only when domestic concentration ranges from one to three (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005: 112–15). Very few cases of incomplete transitions for these values of domestic concentration exist in the data, and measures of uncertainty are missing in the figures. See also Braumoeller's (2004) discussion of interaction effects used in Mansfield and Snyder (2002a).
16. The 1998 article does not employ any control variables. The authors include factors to account for contiguous effects of democratization on conflict as well as major power status and peace years in their 2000 article. Interestingly, they use one-tailed tests in their model.
17. Gleditsch and Ward (2000) differentiate between conflict onset and ongoing conflicts, and show that high variance increases probabilities of remaining in ongoing wars, but not conflict onset itself.
18. Democratization is defined as a change in polity scores from clearly autocratic (<-6) to clearly democratic (>6) persisting over five years, autocratization as change from democratic (>6) to autocratic (<-6), lasting five years as well. The authors admit that this operationalization is problematic since very few countries experience such large changes that then remain stable, and it furthermore excludes all changes in the in-between categories.
19. As the democratic peace suggests, one should expect recently consolidated democracies to be significantly less war prone, and consolidating autocracies to be more war prone. Since Mansfield and Snyder (2002b) conduct only one-tailed tests and expect the relationship for all regime changes to be positive, the threshold for a negative and significant relationship between consolidated democracies and conflict likelihood is lowered.
20. Forty-six out of 202 rivalries were in transition.

21. Future research should also investigate the conflict propensities of autocratizing states. New autocratic leaders may, as well, have incentives to use force to rally support for the newly established regime. In addition, adversaries of autocratic leaders may have more difficulty in estimating the resolve of autocratic elites, and consequently be less able to avoid conflict engagement (Miller, 1999).
22. Normative, institutional and informational approaches provide different explanations for the peaceful behavior of democratic states. Empirical research, however, often lacks measurement that allows for precise differentiation between these theoretical accounts, since most of the research uses the same data. Simply measuring the level of democracy or polity type does not tell us whether norms, constraints or signaling is responsible for a change in foreign policy behavior.
23. Applying arguments drawing on norms and constraints versus informational explanations to transitioning states, however, suggest different expectations for the foreign policy behavior of democratizing states. A model based on signaling abilities anticipates that high variance in democracy levels increases a state's conflict propensities. Normative or institutional arguments do not address the conflict behavior of unevenly democratizing states.
24. After 1920, entities are coded as members of the state system if they either are members of the UN or have a population greater than 500,000 and receive diplomatic missions from two major powers. Data come from <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>.
25. Data in <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID3.html>. MIDs are defined as militarized disputes between sovereign states below and at the threshold of war.
26. I choose their operationalization of regime change because it avoids setting arbitrary thresholds for what one may regard as complete or incomplete regime changes. Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 72) argue that studies measuring 'any shift in democratic direction' do not accurately test their theoretical argument. In their design, any changes from autocracy ($\text{Reg} < -6$) to anocracy ($-7 < \text{Reg} < 7$) are coded as cases of incomplete democratization (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005: 74). Therefore, a change in polity scores from -7 to -5 would be coded as an incomplete transition to democracy. The operationalization used here, however, combines magnitude and direction of change, and can therefore assess whether large change to democracy, not any change, affects conflict probabilities. In addition, Mansfield and Snyder's (2005) design employs a variable not supported in recent versions of the Polity data, and can therefore not be used for more current analyses.
27. Data in <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/>. This dataset includes a new variable called Polity 2, designed to facilitate the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. This variable revises the combined annual polity score by applying a simple treatment, or 'fix', to convert instances of 'standardized authority codes' (i.e. -66 , -77 , and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e. within the range, -10 to $+10$). I use it in this analysis.
28. I also used five- and 15-year lags. A negative relationship for the interaction effect and conflict was found for all time lags. Also, variance was positively related to conflict. However, to ensure better comparability with Gleditsch and Ward's (1998, 2000) work, I report only the results for the 10-year lags.

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29. Democracy-autocracy scores for the current year are calculated by subtracting autocracy scale values from democracy scale values, returning values between -10 and 10. The combined score is suggested to be the most reliable measure (e.g. Oneal and Russett, 1999: 429).
30. Theoretically, the measure can range from -20 to 20.
31. This is different from the research design used by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) as they do not transform negative values, but nevertheless include a variable measuring change and direction, and direction separately in one model. The operationalization used by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) might also explain why the authors derive a negative value for the variable measuring magnitude and direction together (suggesting that democratization decreases the risk of war), but a positive value for the direction of change variable (contradicting the former result). Breaking apart magnitude and direction of change avoids multicollinearity and allows for better assessing the separate impact of the two component parts.
32. I thank one anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.
33. The CINC score is a composite measure of the COW national capabilities index as developed by Singer et al. (1972) and Singer (1987). This is an index of a state's proportion of total system capabilities in six areas: the country's iron/steel production, the country's urban population, the country's total population, the country's total military expenditures, the country's total military personnel and the country's total amount of energy production.
34. Since this variable also violates the normality assumption, I take the natural log.
35. Continuous variables are held at their means; dichotomous variables at their mode.
36. One reviewer suggested that the conflict behavior of democratizing states may be sensitive to the similarity of neighboring regimes. A model including an interaction term between the democratization and neighborhood indicators, however, did not provide significant evidence for such interactive effects. It seems that the signaling abilities of democratizing states are not further enhanced in the presence of democratic neighboring regimes. Results are available upon request.
37. Note that the positive and significant coefficient for the dummy democratization variable is a result of the interaction term in the model. It indicates the effect of change toward democracy on conflict onset when absolute change is zero, a scenario that cannot occur empirically.
38. Absolute change, the interaction term, and the dummy democratization variable are varied from their minimum to their maximum (from 0 to 1 for the dummy variable) simultaneously for this graph. All graphs were produced using the software Clarify (Tomsz et al., 2003).
39. Former US President Clinton distinguished more explicitly between the monadic and dyadic variant of the argument, stating that 'democracies don't go to war against each other' in a speech at Harvard University, 21 November. 2001. <http://www.news.harvard.edu/specials/2001/clinton/clintonspeech.html>

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*Appendix**Table 3*

Logit Regression Estimates for MID Onset, Regime
Change Variables Only 1950–2000

Variable	Onset Model 3	Onset Model 4
Variance	0.100*** (0.035)	–
Direction of Change	–0.096 (0.084)	0.188** (0.092)
Absolute Change	–	0.017 (0.011)
Change * Direction	–	–0.035** (0.015)
Constant	–0.109 (0.082)	–0.225*** (0.064)
	N=4195	N=5285

Note: Coefficients are estimated using logit regression with natural cubic splines and Huber/White standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates for three cubic splines are not reported.

*** $p < .01$

** $p < .05$