

PIRATE LANDS: GOVERNANCE AND MARITIME PIRACY

Book Prospectus

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Main Aim and Themes

Maritime piracy nearly disappeared in the 19th and 20th centuries. Attacks occurred sporadically in Indonesia and the Philippines, but were generally rare and not particularly sophisticated. The U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (USNGIA), which started collecting data on piracy incidents in the late 1970s, recorded 90 incidents from 1980-1989, and only 6% of these were hijackings or kidnappings. Yet when the Cold War ended, piracy incidents reemerged in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, and later also in the Gulf of Aden and off Nigeria's coast, increasing in numbers and intensity over the 1990s and the 2000s. Data collected by the USNGIA show 555 incidents from 1990-1999, 11% of which were hijackings. This rise in the number and sophistication of piracy is linked to the end of the Cold War for several reasons. First, the withdrawal of military, economic, and ideological support provided to developing countries significantly weakened states that now had to rely on their own domestic military, bureaucratic, and economic capacity. Second, coinciding trends of democratization and economic liberalization made it more difficult for national regimes to retain control of state power, while simultaneously producing large increases in trade volumes. Transported primarily on ships, increasing inter-state commerce provided pirates with lucrative targets. Hence, developing countries previously dependent on superpower support were struggling to retain coercive power, control society, and police territory. For these very reasons, state weakness and lack of control over territory are often mentioned as prime explanations for the reemergence of maritime piracy.

The argument developed in this book agrees with the general notion that piracy, like civil war, terrorism, and other organized crime, is a problem of weak and fragile states. At the national level, our research therefore posits, and empirically corroborates, that state weakness is associated with piracy. Yet while helpful in identifying the countries most affected by maritime piracy, focusing on the weakness of entire countries cannot help us understand why piracy clusters close to some coastal communities but not others. In Indonesia, for example, coastal areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the Riau islands share similarly favorable geographic conditions and proximity to busy shipping lanes, yet pirate organizations are found only in some places. Similarly, there are more than 15 ports or anchorages on the Indonesian island of Java, but little piracy, while the eastern side of Kalimantan possesses an equivalent number of harbors but experiences significantly more commerce raiding and armed robbery. Zooming in further, among the many islands that are part of the Riau Archipelago, some, such

as Bintan, Batam, Karimun, are especially known for harboring pirates despite similarly favorable geographic and strategic conditions as other islands. We argue that local governance and infrastructural development help explain pirate location. Pirate operations require substantial upfront investments that are helped by proximity to markets and infrastructure. For sophisticated attacks, a group leader or boss provides pirates with a boat, fuel, equipment such as hooks, and money to bribe officials.¹ Proximity to economic activity also matters for recruitment, since freelance pirates are recruited from cafes and bars where they are known to hang out, such as some neighborhoods of Batam or Tanjung Pinang.² In the aftermath of a successful attack, access to black markets is important to resell stolen fuel and other goods. According to one former Indonesian pirate, “stolen diesel is sold to dealers serving Batam’s dozens of ports and shipyards for use in trucks, boats or generators, or to black marketeers in Singapore where legal fuel is more expensive.”³

Our argument helps address this puzzling variation in piracy by connecting the capacity of the central state to its local configurations, arguing that variation in the local governance patterns combined with the strength of the central regime has important consequences for the incidence and organization of maritime piracy. In failed and weak states, the absence or relative weakness of the central state means that the permissive conditions for piracy are present, yet organized piracy emerges sub-nationally as a function of particular local governance configurations. We argue that local conditions that provide opportunities for collusion with local stakeholders but also provide pirates with the markets and infrastructure required to sustain predation are most likely to produce favorable conditions for piracy. We therefore expect that in weak or failed states, pirates will operate in coastal areas where local governance is weak enough to facilitate and incentivize collusion among pirates and authorities, yet strong enough to ensure that infrastructure and markets are also sufficiently developed to permit the organization of sustained piracy. In weak states, sophisticated pirate groups are most likely to emerge in proximity to areas with intermediate local capacity, i.e. those that are neither strong nor weak. Piracy may occur in locally weaker or stronger areas within those states, but is expected to be less common and remain less organized. In contrast, piracy in strong states occurs only sporadically, because even in areas where the central state is less present, it can intervene and prevent the rise of criminal organizations. Moreover, the incentives that produce collusion tend not to exist. Our argument thus highlights how national and local governance interact to produce the conditions for piracy.

We examine these arguments empirically with a variety of methods. We use quantitative methods to establish general patterns between governance and piracy in a global sample, and in subnational analyses of national and local governance configurations and piracy in Indonesia. These analyses employ current and archival data on governance and piracy, including fine-grained, micro level data on nighttime lights emissions but also colonial era

¹ Information from original interviews, corroborated in other research, such as Frecon 2006, 2014; Biggs 2016; van Hoesslin 2016.

² See fn. 2.

³ Quoted in Andrew Marshall, “Petro Pirates Plague Busy Southeast Asia Shipping Lanes,” Reuters, July 9 2014., <https://www.reuters.com/article/indonesia-pirates/petro-pirates-plague-busy-southeast-asia-shipping-lanes-idUSL4N0PK2U920140709>

governance data from the Dutch Indies. We complement these quantitative analyses with evidence from expert interviews and interviews from field research in Indonesia. We supplement our study of Indonesia with sub-national analyses of Nigeria and Somalia.

Maritime Piracy and the Study of Transnational Crime

Policymakers and scholars frequently assert that organized crime such as narcotics production, human trafficking, the arms trade, money laundering, and maritime piracy is extensive, increasing, and hence constitutes a major security threat. The Obama Administration, for example, noted that “criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. These networks also threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments and using the power and influence of those elements to further their criminal activities.”⁴ The U.S. Department of Defense Counter-narcotics and Global Threats Strategy group similarly claims that “transnational organized crime represents a significant, multilayered, and asymmetric threat to our national security...It is not viable for DOD to continue to examine this complex threat through the single lens of the drug trade.”⁵

However, while there is no shortage of expressions of concern over organized crime, empirical assessments of the extent, cost, and nature of organized criminal activity remain rare. Whether it is illegal drug production and transit, human trafficking, illegal arms trade, or money laundering, systematic accounts are limited because of the lack of regional or global data, particularly in the global South. The dearth of data stems rather intuitively from the interest in secrecy for criminal organizations, but is exacerbated by challenges in collecting cross-nationally comparable data in developing countries most affected by crime. Data are often missing precisely for the countries that struggle most with crime. Excellent single-country studies of different types of crime such exist (Phongpaichit, Sungsidh, and Nualnoi 1998; Gambetta 1993), but regional or global empirical analyses are rare (Patrick 2011), and have to rely on incomplete global statistics. We overcome these limitations by taking advantage of the availability of global data on piracy collected by several organizations. These data provide global information on the location, date, and type of piracy attacks taking place in the post-Cold War period. The involvement of multiple organizations also facilitates the assessment of reporting biases, helping to address concerns about data quality (see chapter 4 for a discussion of the data). Unlike research on other types of transnational crime, our book thus offers a systematic, global and subnational exploration of maritime piracy.

We recognize that maritime piracy is a distinct form of crime influenced by a variety of particular geographic, economic, and political conditions. Under international law, piracy is defined as “illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship” against another ship on the high

⁴ Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. 2011. [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime July 2011.pdf](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy%20to%20Combat%20Transnational%20Organized%20Crime%20July%202011.pdf). Accessed on 4 October 2014.

⁵ Quoted in St. Clair and Canna (2013, 5).

seas.⁶ However, we also include armed robbery on ships as another form of maritime piracy, which follows coding rules developed by the International Maritime Bureau. This book, though, is relevant beyond piracy. First, our governance-focused argument has implications for other crime. The presence of corruptible local actors together with the availability of markets and infrastructure could be applied to the drug trade, human trafficking, prostitution, etc. Indeed, narcotics production in South America, money laundering in West Africa, and wildlife smuggling in Burma all are effected by corruption and illicit markets. Second, there are plenty of reasons to believe that piracy has spillover effects and can help facilitate other crime, such as illegal fishing, human trafficking, and even rebellion.

Relationship to Existing Literature

Scholars frequently point to state weakness and fragility as playing a crucial role in facilitating non-state crime and violence (Murphy 2009, Sung 2004, Mentan 2004, Patrick 2011). Mentan (2004, 193), for example, asserts that “today’s weak and/or failed African states, such as Sierra Leone and Somalia, are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty.” These ungoverned spaces have been designated *terra ex lex*, lands without law, in the works of Palmer (2014).⁷ De Wijk (2009, 17) claims that “in places where government authority has ceased to exist, predation and lawlessness form the foundation for pirates to organize and engage in attacks.” Yet this center-state focus is fundamentally problematic if we want to understand where pirate gangs locate within countries and the mechanisms that enable their persistence. Governance capacity frequently remains a country-level concept, where regimes are measured or evaluated only at the center (the capital). But even countries with weak national regimes enjoy areas that are well governed. These local political structures emerge to fill the governance void created by a weak and frequently corrupt state. Clunan (2010, 6), for example writes “...the state is assumed to be the critical actor in providing governance and generating authority” but really “alternative authority and governance structures” at the regional or local level can “complement or outperform state efforts.” As the business of piracy requires, in the words of Palmer (2014, 10) “structural support systems,” chaos on land is not conducive to profitable black-market trade in stolen goods. Hence, it is not “weak local government authority” that is the “key determinant of piracy” as de Wijk (2009, 17) insists. Rather, it is a mix of weakness and strength that may provide the conditions for successful commerce raiding. The presence of weak and or corrupt national political structures, coupled with local governance that facilitates order and economic exchange, creates the conditions conducive to illicit activity.

Our research builds on the work of others who have stressed that local political and economic conditions influence the emergence and persistence of pirate groups, but makes important theoretical and empirical improvements. Several authors have highlighted the role of local formal and informal institutions (Hastings 2009, 2012; Shortland and Varese 2015;

⁶ UNCLOS article 101. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

⁷ Palmer (2014) recognizes that pure disorder does not favor the business of piracy. He finds illicit activity to locate where governance remains ineffective and corrupt. Palmer further notes that local, informal and formal, governing structures exist in Somalia that provide order and stability but also can be captured or corrupted by criminal gangs. However, it is unclear whether Palmer sees criminal gangs providing security, order, and perhaps certain services that are demanded by local communities.

Percy and Shortland 2013; Coggins 2016; Hansen 2009). These authors emphasize that even illicit markets require governance and stability, which challenges the prevailing narrative linking governance voids to commerce raiding and armed robbery at sea. Our theoretical contribution to this literature is twofold. First, we theorize how the central state, local governance actors, and pirates interact in creating the conditions for piracy. In previous work, authors focused on either macro, or state-level, patterns, or the local level, considering them in isolation, and at times coming to opposite empirical implications. Our argument highlights that at the national level, weak state capacity leads to greater incidence of maritime piracy, expecting a largely linear empirical relationship. Yet these national-level associations do not imply that the least governed spaces are most conducive to piracy in weak states; rather some political and economic governance is necessary for piracy to flourish. Second, and connected to the first point, we theorize the dimensions of local political and economic governance that matter for piracy incidence and organization. We highlight two dimensions; the extent to which local actors are corruptible to help pirates avoid capture, and whether sufficient markets and infrastructure are present to sustain organized pirate activity. Empirically, the book systematically analyzes subnational patterns, while existing empirical research has mostly relied on country-level governance data even when making claims about local patterns. Hastings (2009) relies on World Bank governance indicators of state capacity measured at the center, while Shortland and Percy (2013) use national counts of rainfall monitoring contracts and FAO-observed markets. Shortland and Varese (2015) present qualitative and descriptive material supporting their claims on local protection, but offer no systematic evidence. Coggins (2016) uses maps to broadly distinguish the capacity of Somali regions and links regional capacity to piracy. No study, however, has used disaggregated, micro-level data on capacity and piracy in systematic empirical analyses.

Several books on the determinants of modern piracy have been published in the past 10-15 years. Martin Murphy's 2009 book entitled *Small Boats, Weak States, and Dirty Money* (Columbia University Press) is probably the best known. Other texts include Jay Bahadur's (2011) journalistic account of Somali piracy (Profile Books) and Stefan Eklöf Amirell's (2006) work on piracy in Southeast Asia (NIAS Press). The chapters in the edited volume on piracy in the Southeast Asia by Liss and Biggs (2016) focus on recent trends and changes in the organization of piracy. An earlier edited volume by Ong-Webb (2006) include discussions of definitional issues, descriptive patterns, and historical and current case studies of piracy in Southeast Asia. The volume edited by Peter Lehr (2007) provides qualitative assessments of links between piracy and maritime terrorism in several case studies, but no systematic assessment.

However, existing books do not systematically theorize and assess the conditions contributing maritime piracy, and there is no book that uses a social scientific approach to study maritime piracy. Murphy's (2009) text is probably most similar to ours, but important differences remain. While Murphy covers definitional questions (chapter 1) and presents descriptive data on pirate attacks (chapter 2), he does not develop or test theoretical mechanisms on which structural or sub-national conditions affect pirate attacks. Murphy's sections on maritime terrorism and insurgency also remain only illustrative, using anecdotal evidence to draw connections and conclusions. Finally, Murphy's text was written and published before the decline of Somali piracy in 2011. Since then, incidents in the Greater Gulf

of Aden have declined dramatically, while attacks have increased in the Gulf of Guinea and returned to the waters of Indonesia. In comparison, our text develops a general theoretical explanation of piracy focused on states' ability to project power across space and assesses these expectations systematically using cross-national and sub-national data. Our book also develops links between piracy, governance, and local infrastructure, arguing that criminal actors such as pirates require not anarchy and complete state collapse, but political and economic stability. Importantly, we use a variety of systematic methodological approaches to empirically examine our arguments.

Intellectual Contribution

Modern piracy was in part triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which weakened central governments and created space for alternative local governing structures. Regimes at the center lost superpower resources as well as some of the ideological glue that held societies together, both of which had sustained centralized power projection (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). In this environment, rebel groups and predatory non-state actors arose to contest state authority and legitimacy, but also local institutions materialized to fill voids left by weakening states. Elites in capital cities, such as Abuja, Mogadishu, and Jakarta were forced to locate new revenue streams to extend the reach of the national state. Likewise, local officials pursued resource opportunities that would underwrite infrastructure development and guarantee market stability. In some places, licit resource extraction emerged from local governance, but in others illicit economies arose sustained by bribery, fraud, and coercion. Across developing countries formerly supported by the superpowers, we observe that a weakening of central state strength is accompanied by a variety of outcomes, including violent political challenges to the state, the rise of criminal networks, but also peaceful outcomes. While research has established Cold War effects on state and rebel capacity, effects on crime remain underexplored, driven at least in part by poor data availability on transnational crime.

Yet even though the end of the Cold War weakened central states, it does not necessarily follow that strengthening centralized capacity is the only or even the best mechanism for countering non-state groups that sometimes fill governance voids. Authority structures arise locally in response to the actions or inactions of national elites and frequently the elimination of contested spaces favors certain elites over others (Menkhaus 2006/07). Questions or concerns about governance failures are thus less about governance and more about who should or shouldn't govern. The very idea that spaces are ungoverned reflects a widespread belief that sovereignty lies only at the center and alternative governance mechanisms merely introduce instability and institutional incoherence that allow predatory non-state actors to emerge and prosper (Clunan 2010). But local authority does not invariably initiate political, economic, and social turmoil. To the extent that local governance empowers criminal actors through corruption and collusion, communities may reasonably decide that order and public good provisions warrant such arrangements.⁸

⁸ Organized criminal groups gravitate towards weak and failing states since the volatile environment tends to provide economic opportunities that are hard to find in more stable countries. These opportunities include inexpensive labor, an unfettered regulatory setting, and shelter from capture (Ruth, Matusitz, and Wan 2015). Yet, these same groups require sufficiently established infrastructure for the "production, transportation and storage of

We build on research emphasizing local actors and conceptualize the dimensions of local governance that matter for piracy incidence and organization, outlined in Table 1 below. We underline two countervailing implications of subnational local governance in weak states. First, prospective pirates benefit from fragile or weak local governance because it creates opportunities for collusion with local state or non-state actors. To be successful, pirates require the tacit or active support of local actors such as community leaders, customs officials, police forces, or port employees. For this reason, pirate groups should establish themselves in locales where the state is weak and authorities bribable. In areas where the central government lacks control over local authorities, pirates find opportunities for collusion that help lower the risk of capture. But second, pirates also need access to markets and infrastructure to sell their stolen goods. This suggests that more developed areas should be attractive for potential pirates. Regions where local capacity is particularly weak lack the necessary infrastructure and governance needed for even illicit markets. These two implications suggest, then, that opportunities for piracy to emerge, become organized, and remain active over time should be greatest in areas where the state is weak but not absent. This implies a curvilinear relationship between sub-national governance and maritime pirate activity.

Table 1: Local Governance and Piracy in Weak States

	Presence of markets and infrastructure	
Opportunity for collusion	Low	High
Low	N/A	Some piracy, but unorganized
High	Rare and unorganized piracy	High and organized

Our research highlights the importance of deconstructing the concept of the state and disaggregating spatial and temporal units of measurement. Governments at the center have seen their administrative reach shrink and their normative authority eroded. Accordingly, local actors have emerged to in some cases take their place. But local governance is not necessarily a panacea for eradicating predatory criminal activity. Indeed, in Nigeria and Somalia, it has facilitated it. Strengthening governance at national and local levels may help reduce political violence and the prevalence of criminal organizations, such as pirates. But such capacity building must be coupled with improvements in legitimacy as well as welfare enhancement. Reducing the demand for piracy is as important as increasing the ability of national and local political authorities to apprehend pirates. Effective policy responses to the rise of non-state predatory criminal actors must however recognize the complex authority structures that exist within individual countries.

Nature of the Research

illegal market items” (Ruth, Matusitz, and Wan 2015, 592). It seems odd, though, to classify states that possess such market structures as failed. We note that weak national governing institutions may allow criminal groups to emerge, but such illicit actors then partner with local authorities to ensure a stable economic environment.

Our book is the first text on maritime piracy that uses a systematic, social scientific approach. We build on the work of Boulding (1962) and scholars highlighting the territorial dimension of state capacity (see e.g. Soifer, 2008 and Buhaug and Gates, 2002). We argue that aggregated country-level analyses provide an incomplete, and sometime imprecise, picture of the mechanisms driving maritime piracy. In particular, the linear relationship between state strength and piracy observed at the country-level may not obtain in more disaggregated analyses. Kalyvas (2003, 2006) similarly notes that country-level cleavages do not fully explain civil war dynamics. The local political environment also has important implications for the level and type of violence witnessed. It seems not only that piracy attacks may vary non-linearly with more localized measures of governance, but further that applying a structural framework to the local level risks misdiagnosing the conditions enabling pirate attacks. One should eschew assumptions that implicitly standardize macro-level and micro-level processes (Kalyvas, 2006; also see Weidman, 2016). Indeed, while organized piracy may avoid environments characterized by very low or very high institutional capacity, opportunistic or subsistence piracy, like small-scale armed robbery, may flourish in all locations regardless of local governance conditions.⁹

We use a variety of methods to examine the empirical implications of the theory. Our primary approach is quantitative. We use national and subnational indicators of governance, piracy, and control variables to systematically assess hypotheses in empirical models of global and Indonesian piracy. In all empirical analyses, we include controls for alternative explanations, including measures of economic grievance and lack of legal employment options, spatial opportunity, weather, regime type, and population. These measures supplement our capacity indicators and the results demonstrate that regardless of model specification, governance associates with maritime piracy, linearly at the state level and non-linearly at the sub-national level. Drawing on work highlighting the long-term implications of colonial settlement patterns for governance, our quantitative analyses also include data collected from archival research. We use archival data from Dutch colonial state building projects in Indonesia and link these data to piracy to provide additional evidence in favor of our argument. Such indicators of governance are less subject to reverse causality.

We complement quantitative analyses with qualitative evidence from. Field research conducted in the Riau Islands is helpful in further assessing the plausibility of the causal mechanisms. Elite interviews with representatives of organizations focused on counterpiracy, such as ReCAAP, the Information Fusion Centre, and the IMB allow us to assemble further material to examine our expectations.

Plan of the Book

Chapter 2 presents a historically grounded review of research on maritime piracy. Rather than summarizing reflections on the causes of modern piracy, we examine the conditions that produced piracy in the past and note similarities with contemporary marauding. In line with the book's main focus on governance, we focus on the presence of societal disorder and state capacity as two critical, political correlates of commerce raiding. Neither is a necessary or

⁹ Whitman and Suarez (2012) similarly identify subsistence and organized pirates, with the latter requiring infrastructure that facilitates the trafficking of stolen goods.

sufficient condition for the development of pirate groups, but each increases the chances that predatory criminal gangs will arise bent on exploiting the turmoil of political violence and unruliness. Importantly, we consider the implications of governance voids at the national and sub-national levels. Grievance (both poverty and illegal fishing), as well as geographic opportunity, also plays an important role in the onset and persistence of piracy. Evidence clearly shows low wages and joblessness to drive individuals out of the licit economy and into the arms of warlords and pirate bosses. We conclude the chapter by assessing the efficacy of counter-piracy operations, focusing especially on efforts designed to rebuild political and economic institutions, reduce corruption, and foster good governance.

Chapter 3 presents our theoretical argument. We argue that local governance has two important, yet somewhat countervailing implications for the incidence and organization of piracy. On the one hand, pirates look for weakly governed areas where opportunities for collusion are plentiful. But on the other hand, they need access to infrastructure and markets for successful criminal activity, suggesting that areas of intermediate state strength are most attractive for piracy. These expectations should hold most strongly for more organized forms of piracy maritime piracy since spontaneous, short-term opportunistic attacks could still occur in weak or strong areas. A sub-national research design remains essential for testing this contention since national indicators of state capacity cannot capture this subnational spatial variation.

Our empirical analyses begin in Chapter 4. We first define the events included in our study and reflect on the implications of our coding criteria. We then illustrate piracy over the past 24 years using data collected and crosschecked from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the U.S. National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (ASAM). Our intent is to provide the reader with a sense of the geographical spread and temporal scope of the maritime threat faced by the international community. Finally, we present provisional evidence that state capacity at the center associates with maritime piracy, but also that opportunity and local capacity influence pirate location.

The empirical analyses presented in chapters 5-6 provide the main evidence for the posited relationship between institutional capacity and maritime piracy. Chapter 5 explores pirate attacks at the country-level. We find that aggregate measures of state weakness correlate with piracy and that the relationship remains mostly linear in orientation. We also find that the effects of structural capacity on piracy are shaped by distance. Boulding's loss of strength gradient applies to a regime's ability to control the emergence and persistence of pirate groups. Finally, our analyses confirm that pirates locate away from state power.

In chapter 6, we present quantitative and qualitative evidence to examine the subnational relationship governance and piracy in Indonesia. In quantitative analyses for Indonesia, we disaggregate the unit of analysis to the grid cell and explore the relationship between piracy and local measures of institutional capacity. Relying on either ocean cells and land cells, we observe a curvilinear link between local governance and piracy. There does appear to be a capacity 'sweet spot' that attracts criminal type organizations that engage in sophisticated maritime attacks. We find less evidence that opportunistic piracy is similarly affected by local measures of institutional quality. We provide additional, qualitative information for the importance of infrastructure and collusion from our fieldwork interviews in the Riau Islands.

In Chapter 7, we follow up our analyses on Indonesia with sub-national empirical investigations of Nigeria and Somalia. Both countries offer radically different maritime environments that enable us to test the robustness of our theoretical argument. Both countries have also experienced considerable maritime piracy over the past two decades driven in part by insurgencies and local governance meant to challenge or supplant national regime authority. We once again find a curvilinear association between local capacity and commerce raiding. The finding is stronger in Nigeria than Somalia in part because Somalia has so little development, which makes it difficult to tease out the capacity-piracy relationship.

In the concluding chapter, we first review our theoretical argument and evidence, noting the empirical support for our national and sub-national conjectures. Weak states attract pirates and other criminal elements, but within weak states illicit actors gravitate towards local environments characterized by corruptible elites and suitable transportation and communication infrastructure. These settings offer pirates the labor and economic foundations for the trafficking of stolen goods. Our findings confirm that expectations on state capacity and piracy do not travel neatly across levels of analysis. Next, we forecast trends in maritime piracy and consider how the international community can best counter organized commerce raiding. Strengthening national regimes may help, but it will not entirely eliminate piracy and may in the short term actually increase it. A focus on improving local governance, by reducing corruption and joblessness likely offers a more effective solution to organized piracy.

Length

Including approximately 7-8 chapters, we anticipate a book approximately 200-300 pages in length, and around 60,000 words.

Planned Delivery Date and Audience

We intend to complete a draft of all chapters by the end of May 2018. At the time of writing (January 2018), we have complete drafts of chapters 1-6, leaving only sub-national analyses of Nigeria and Somalia and concluding chapter to complete over the next few months.

a. Political Scientists, Social Scientists, and Humanities Scholars

Our manuscript engages multiple areas of research and so should be of interest to scholars in numerous disciplines. First, we engage literature and research focused squarely on maritime piracy, which is an area of investigation that involves political scientists, economists, historians, criminologists, and geographers. Second, we center our work in a larger research program focused on state capacity and good governance and so our inquiry connects to extant research on the causes of civil war, insurgency, terrorism and organized crime. Third, we examine piracy at both the state and sub-state levels, which enables us to refine the relationship between governance and commerce raiding. Finally, we use a variety of empirical methods, including large-n statistical analyses, spatial modeling at the sub-state level, and direct interviews conducted in the Riau Islands of Indonesia.

b. Maritime Piracy Specialists

Maritime piracy concerns experts in a wide range of academic and non-academic settings. Non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations, as well as private maritime firms, all devote resources to the maritime domain. Our empirical modeling, rich data, and sub-national

explorations will appeal to specialists in maritime security outside of the traditional academic setting.

c. Policymakers and Bureaucrats working on issues of Global Security

The manuscript's accessible style, the richness of the data analyzed, and the clear visualization of piracy information will attract policymakers, Foreign Service and defense officials, and intelligence analysts interested in issues of global and maritime security. As part of our project, which was funded for four years by the U.S. Office of Naval Research, we have been asked to give briefings to the US Department of Defense and the Dutch Navy.

d. Graduate Students

Finally, faculty offering graduate-level seminars in political science, economics, and geography could adopt this manuscript. This book would fit well in courses that address violent non-state actors, transnational criminal organizations, maritime and global security, and of course historical and modern piracy.

II. About the Authors

Ursula Daxecker is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, a member of the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, and associate editor at *European Journal of International Relations*. Her research interests focus on political violence, with current projects examining maritime piracy and electoral violence. Her work has appeared in *British Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and *Journal of Peace Research*, among others. Current projects are funded by grants from the U.S. Department of Defense Minerva Initiative, the European Commission Marie Curie actions, and the Dutch Science Foundation NWO.

Brandon Prins is Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Global Security Fellow at the Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy, and former associate editor of *Foreign Policy Analysis*. His research addresses the causes and consequences of political violence and his articles have appeared in *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, and the *British Journal of Political Science*. The U.S. Office of Naval Research, Y-12 National Security Complex, and the National Nuclear Security Administration have funded Dr. Prins' research.

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